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ABSTRACT
MORAL EDUCATION WITHOUT INDOCTRINATION
FLEMING, Alethea Denise, M.Ed* University of the Witwatorarand,
1985.
This research report attempts to provide a plausible 
answer to the question of how it is possible to morally educate 
without indoctrination. This question is centrally concerned 
with the problem of finding a rational justification for morality. 
Intuition!s« and eaotiviem can offer no answers. Universal 
preocriptiviam, in its latest formulation^ can take one a great 
distahoe towards this goal* In its emphasis on the element of 
constraint and the importance of criticism, it can provide moral 
education with a rational bare. For this reason it has profound 
implications for moral education especially as regards the 
avoidance of indoctrination.
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PREFACE
The aim of this research report is to provide a plausible 
answer to the problem of how it is possible to morally educate 
without indoctrination. Indoctrination, I shall argue, 
indicates a diminishing of rationality thus any attempt to 
overcome indoctrination in moral education implies a central 
concern with finding a rational base for moral thinking*
This project of finding a rational base for morality is, 
of course, a notoriously difficult enterprise which has taxed 
moral philosophers up to the present time. MacIntyre's 
controversial book, After virtue (31) represents yet another 
more recent attempt to tackle this problem but from a radically 
different perspective.
It is not without trepidation, therefore, that 1 turn my 
mind to this problem and venture to suggest that Professor 
R.M. Hare's latest ethical theory can take one a great distance 
towards this goal. This has, of course, been, denied by many 
philosophers who are quite prepared to equate prescriptivism 
with emotivism on the grounds that prescriptivism, like 
emotivism, 'cannot find much place for argument.' (51:42)
More recently, the criticism levelled at prescriptivism is 
that it implies an unjustified choice, 'a choice unguided by 
criteria.* (31:20)
Once prescriptivism has been equated with emotivism which 
denies morality a rational status, finding s rational base for 
morality becomes impossible. From this standpoint a strong
version of relativism is indefensible. Similarly, libertarian 
theories of education which often presuppose an anarchistic 
epistemology cannot be refuted. It is with this in mind that 
I have chosen to argue against these two viewpoints and to 
show how Hare's universal prescriptivism is incompatible with 
these views.
Chapter one will be concerned with unravelling the meaning 
of the concept of indoctrination and moral if joctrination. In 
chapter two, I will argue against a libertarian view which 
holds that moral education is unnecessary and in this way 
deprives it of its importance and any impetus on the part of 
educators to involve themselves in this task. A refutation 
of ethical cultural relativism which denies that moral education 
is possible will follow in chapter three. Chapter four will 
examine intuitionism and emotivism and their adequacy as 
ethical theories for moral education. It is my argument that
Professor Hare's theory is able to take one further than either
of these two theories and because of this can provide a 
rational base for moral education. The rest of the chapter will 
be concerned with an outline of hie theory.
In the concluding chapter I will advance arguments in 
support of my viewpoint showing how universal prescriptivism 
entails a type of moral thinking which is of profound
importance for moral education because it is essentially anti-
indoctrinatory in character.
1
CHAPTER ONE 
INDOCTRINATION
1. INTRODUCTION
At the heart of moral education ia the vital question: 
given the uncertain nature of morality and the fact of inter­
minable moral disagreement, how does one overcome the problem 
of bias? This raises the further question, ’Are educators 
entitled to contribute directly to the formation of specific 
moral values in children?'
These are difficult questions. Libertarians deny that 
educators have this right. They believe that each individual 
ought to be free to make up his own mind on moral matters and 
that this should be left to nature rather than schooling.
These views raise questions as to whether we should regard 
moral education as necessary. We cannot, however, consider 
life without morality and therefore it is not unreasonable to 
suppose that we should take seriously the suggestion that 
children should be initiated into the demands of a moral order.
Acquainting the child with these demands is not an easy 
task. Firstly, there is a lack of agreement on moral matters 
and secondly, there is the difficulty clearly elucidated by 
Bring (38:64) regarding the necessity of reconciling the 
tension between a respect for the child's individual way of 
thinking, feeling and questioning while at the same time 
retaining a belief in the superiority of the public traditions 
of thought that, as a teacher one represents and can introduce 
to pupils.
2. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS
Indoctrination is a confusing concept. It has a great
2variety of meanings for different persons and at many points 
ambiguities and contradictions arise to confound any attempt 
at a precise definition. Wittgenstein's notion of language as 
having an indefinite set of meanings mirrored in various 
language games seems pertinent and it is not surprising that 
writings on the subject reveal conflicting views as regards 
which criterion constitutes the essence of indoctrination. 
Traditionally, conflict centres on four criteria; method, 
content, intention and consequence., The only area of agreement 
appears to exist in the belief that indoctrination is 
concerned with imparting beliefs.
Searching for one absolutely correct analysis is futile 
since the meaning of indoctrination depends very much on how 
it is uoed in a particular context. I will explore various 
opinions according to the four criteria, mentioned.and another, 
accepting those views which appear plausible. In this way*
I hope to formulate a general idea of what indoctrination 
implies which will form a framework against which the adequacy 
of various ethical theories can be judged.
3. INDOCTRINATION IS A PEJORATIVE TERM,
Indoctrination is almost universally rejected and this 
rejection is a recent phenomenon. Prior to this century the 
term indoctrination was used interchangeably with the word 
education. (44:9) According to the Concise Oxford dictionary 
of current Enmlish it means, 'to teach, instruct,imbue with a 
doctrine, idea or opinion.’ (13:620) There is no reference to 
its use as a derogatory term. Nevertheless, the sense in 
which it predominates in general use today is overwhelmingly
negative. The term picks out something objectionable; elements 
of cioeroion. If we accept that indoctrination is pejorative, 
we must also accept that its conceptual utility is limited. It 
cannot also mean merely to teach, nor can we speak of the out­
come of indoctrination as positive. Indoctrination is opprobrious 
and therefore it cannot be regarded as necessary to education. 
Education is a concept #ith normative implications. It would 
be a logical contradiction to say that someone had been 
educated but had not changed for the better. Indoctrination 
represents as Wilson (56123) points out, a boring failure to 
tackle the problem of the child’s development. We are thus 
compelled to reject accounts which attempt to blur this 
distinction by making it appear acceptable.
These accounts are given by Green (18:44-45), Moore 
(33:97-98) Mid Wilson (56:20-21). These-writers refer to the 
necessity of using non-rational methods with young children.
While one cannot deny this necessity, one can question whether 
the derogatory connotations of indoctrination are applicable 
in these situations. I suggest that these writers have 
confused the early socialisation of the child with the concept 
of indoctrination. This is because they have failed to 
consider another important criterion, the intention of the 
agent.
4. CRITERIA FOR INDOCTRINATION
The four criteria, consequence, method, content and 
intention are Inextricably interwoven. To examine each one in 
isolation from the other is an artificial way to proceed but 
it is necessary in order to reveal the implications of each
criterion.
4.1 Consequence
The consequence criterion has generally been overlooked 
but it is an important criterion for it is through the end 
product that we can cay that the child is indoctrinated. It 
is because we observe this consequence that we are anxious 
to avoid it. We speak of someone being indoctrinated when we 
detect that he has a closed mind. A closed mlfid is undesirable 
because it implies that a per in has an unyielding and inflexible 
commitment to ideas which have been acquired for no good reason 
which makes him impervious to rational discussion. (>$54) It 
alerts us to the fact, not merely that the child has certain 
beliefs, but that he holds them in a certain way, in an 
unquestioning way.
The criterion is a necessary condition for indoctrination 
because unless we can detect this end result we could not be 
sure that the child had been indoctrinated. We cannot, however, 
conclude that every time we come across a child with a closed 
wind that he must be indoctrinated. This criterion may be one 
possibility amongst others such as a low intelligence or a 
poor home background. It cannot, therefore, function as a 
sufficient condition for indoctrination. (45:4) Nevertheless, 
it should not be overlooked for paying close attention to the 
consequence or what happens tc ‘•he learner can be, I suggest, 
the key to discovering whether the child is indoctrinated and 
this may lie beyond the intention, content and method of the 
teacher.
54.2 Method
Indoctrination is held to be a particular method of 
bringing about belief. The methods which the indoctrinator 
uses are regarded as undesirable. Some of themiinclude the 
use of approval, rebuket example, charisma, threats, drilling 
and authoritarian approaches which allow little or no discussion 
or questioning. They are usually classed together under the 
umbrella term 'non-rational,1
Defining indoctrination solely in terms of the method 
criterion is inadequate. The use of non-rational methods in 
themselves is not necessarily undesirable, for example, as in 
the training of young children. The context must be examined 
such as the teacher’s intention and the child’s maturity in 
relation to the content taught before any judgement is made. 
Atkinson (in White, 54:118) suggests that indoctrination occurs 
when we use non-rational methods which are unjustified. Hare 
concurs, (19:54) hie view is that they are not bad in them­
selves but only if they are used to produce the closed mind; 
attitudes not open to argument. Oooper (5:54) suggests that 
the method criterion can be a sufficient criterion for 
indoctrination if it is revised to read as follows; -For 
instead of saying that teaching is indoctrination if certain 
methods are employed, we can say that such teaching is 
indoctrination only if these methods are employed despite 
the availability of other rational methods.’ This appears to 
me to be a very plausible argument.
Snook, however, (43:26) believes that the method criterion 
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for indootri-
nation. That it is not a sufficient criterion may be true, if 
it is not revised as was suggested above but is it true that 
it is not a necessary criterion? According to Snook, a comple­
tely non-rational technique could scarcely succeed in getting 
beliefs across. For tha indoctrinated person holds beliefs 
and this requires a degree of understanding; Furthermore, he 
is able to give reasons for his belief and can defend it 
against criticisms.
Snook overlooks the fact that the use of the terra non­
rat ional must be qualified. It is true that the indoctrinated 
person's beliefs cannot be totally non-reasoned, otherwise it 
would not be a belief but it is non-rational in part, to the 
extent that it is indoctrinated. This means that someone else 
has implanted the belief and the person has arrived at the 
belief in a cau.tally motivated way from say, a desire to obey 
rather than in a rationally motivated way. (56:19)
Green (18:52) and Flew (12:11) illustrate how it is 
possible for someone to hold beliefs which can be logically 
incompatible or held without reasons so that we can speak of 
these beliefs as non-rational.
I suggest that indoctrinated beliefs are necessarily non- 
rational in the qualified sense, that they do not provide for 
adequate reasoning and that to this extent they are often 
irrational:unreasoned and illogical. A fully rational method 
could never be equated with indoctrination. No one, for 
example, could come to regard, say, a moral belief as 
absolutely true if he had been taught to examine rationally 
the status of moral propositions. Indoctrination is
7incompatible with a fully rational method and therefore to 
that extent it must be non—rational.
Various writers suggest ways in which methods can be non- 
rational. Gritenden (6:146) talks about 'violence being done 
to the criteria in a particular subject.' This violence 
includes making unwarranted claims, suppressing the critical 
evaluation of reasons and evidence. He includes any unsound 
pedagogical method which is inconsistent with the general 
nature of requirements of inquiry, of moral principles and the 
intellectual and social development of the child. Moore (33:98) 
says that the authoritarian teacher's method of structuring 
the teaching situation is conducive to indoctrination because 
the teacher does not mention othe-v alternatives to his view 
or if he does, he puts them in an unfavourable light. The 
teacher stresses facts at the expense of evidence or the 
justification of these. They are non-rational in that they 
are not fully logical or based on proper reasoning.
Non-rational methods in the qualified sense outlined 
above are important because once we identify them in a teaching 
situation we are alerted to the possibility of indoctrination.
We can question their justification by examining the content 
taught, the intention of the teacher and the affect on the 
pupil.
4.3 Content
The content criterion is contingently related to the 
concept of indoctrination in that certain content is more 
susceptible to indoctrination than others. These areas often 
embody doctrines and are commonly viewed as paradigm cases of
indoctrination. They occur in the fields of politics, religion, 
aesthetics and morality. According to Thiessen (48:15) 
doctrines can also be found in the realm of science and for this 
reason may be just as common in science as in the paradigm cases.
Peters (3?:4l) says that ’whatever else indoctrination may 
mean, it obviously has something to do with doctrines ...’
Flew (12:70) states that indoctrination refers to the implanting 
of doctrines and that the reiteration of the root word doctrines 
may suggest the limitation on the possible content. Thus, 
according to these views, indoctrination concerns the implanting 
of doctrines which form part of a religious, scientific or 
political system of beliefs or ideology.
The problem here is that the term doctrine is too vague. 
According to its dictionary definition, a doctrine means 
something that is taught. (13:360) This leaves the field wide 
open for a variety of interpretations. Some haVe said that 
doctrines are beliefs not known to be true or which cannot, in 
principle, be known to be true. Others, that it means anything 
taught or that it refers to statements not scientifically 
verifiable. As Snook (43:29) points out, however the word 
doctrine is defined, one cannot distinguish via the criteria 
given, the difference between ordinary statements which are 
not true and doctrinal beliefs. If, however, one wants to 
make doctrine mean simply anything taught, then the concept 
becomes empty and there is no point in talking about the evil 
of indoctrination.
The view that doctrines are closely linked to indoctrination 
is prima facie plausible. It is true that we do tend to regard
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the beliefs promoted in religion and politics, for example, 
as doctrines. Deeper reflection reveals that the presence 
of doctrines does not necessarily imply indoctrination. It 
serves rather to indicate that in these areas the danger of 
indoctrination is greater because we are in the realm of 
uncertainty where our facts are not empirically verifiable 
and therefore more difficult to validate, (cf 17:30)
The concept of indoctrination cannot be limited to apply 
only to doctrines for another reason. It will become impos­
sible to conceive of the idea of religious or moral education 
and the development of justifiable courses of study in these 
areas will become impossible. We would only be able to talk 
about religious training not education and every religious 
person will be regarded as indoctrinated. We must reject this 
view because there do exist non-indoctrinary ways of dealing 
with doctrinal belief. If we link indoctrination so inseparably 
with doctrines we rule out the possibility of indoctrination 
occurring in other areas of belief such as the idea that 
simple truths can be indoctrinated or the deliberate teaching 
of what is false, (cf 17:31)
Doctrines explain many cases of indoctrination by 
furnishing the motive. (43:37) By themselves, however, they 
nciuher constitute a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
indoctrination. The only restriction in content which is valid 
is that indoctrination is concerned with handing on beliefs as 
distinct from skills, attitudes or ways of behaving.
4.4 Intention
The intention criterion is supported by Hare, Snook,
10
White and Kilpatrick. Gosher (l?*35) identifies a factor which 
most supporters ef the intention criterion appear to overlook, 
namely, its extreme complexity. There is often no straight 
forward criterion for identifying what a person's intention is 
and nor can many people say precisely what their intention is. 
Intention is significant, nevertheless, because it emphasises 
that children are generally indoctrinated if those, in authority 
are intent on doing so. It is a criterion which merges with 
other criteria so that we detect intention in the chosen 
content, the methods used or the consequences which result. 
Intention is useful on another account, it suggests that 
motives are involved. There are many plausible supporters of 
the intention criterion and it is widely accepted.
According to Hare (19*65) what distinguishes the educator 
from the indoctrinator is his motive: the educator is tryi"g to 
turn children into adults by getting them to think for themselves, 
while the indoctrinator aims at keeping them perpetual children 
or suppressing this process. Hare states (19:52) that 
...'indoctrination only begins when we are trying to stop the 
growth in our children of the capacity to think for themselves 
about moral questions.’
Kilpatrick (26*51) says that if the adult wishes to avoid 
indoctrination his intention must be to acquaint the child with 
reasons for thinking and behaving in a certain way - 'to let 
him in on the reasoning process at work,' The intention should 
be directed from the earliest possible opportunity at bringing 
the child to see the importance of reasoning to control thinking.
White (54:119) holds that the distinguishing features of 
indoctrination occur when the child is brought to believe 'p'
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is true in such a way that nothing will shake this belief. 
White's definition is inadequate because it fails to distin­
guish between desirable and undesirable types of beliefs that 
must be unshakably adhered to,
Snook (4):47) offers a refinement. He states ... 'a 
person indoctrinates p (a proposition or set of propositions) 
if he teaches with the intention that the pupils believe p 
regardless of the evidence.' The notion of evidence is 
problematic. While it is appropriate to speak of evidence 
in empirical contexts, it is inappropriate in the realm of 
religion and morals since there is no obvious objective 
evidence to speak of. Snook attempts to meet this difficulty 
by referring to Scheffler's view. (43:58-59) He says that we 
can construe evidence in a loose sense by taking,it to mean 
'good reasons' and further that what thpse good reasons consist 
of will vary with the subject conceived. The difficulty with 
the term good reasons is that it is an evaluative term and is 
itself open -to dispute. I suggest that it is too vague a term 
to serve as a criterion for identifying indoctrination.
There is another problem with the notion of holding 
beliefs without evidence which is very (similar to the objection 
raised against White's definition. Green (iSill?) agrees that 
indoctrination is marked by a person coming to hold beliefs 
unintelligently, that is, without evidence. Although this view 
is not false, it must be qualified because on this view every­
body could be said to be indoctrinated. In a great many cases, 
it would be impossible to be otherwise. In the teaching 
situation much is imparted without referring to the relevant
evidence. Pupils accept on trust what the teacher imparts and 
often it is this abuse of trust by the teacher which indicates 
indoctrination. As Moore (33:97) points out, learning will 
always even for the rationally mature individual include an 
ingredient of the unreasoned, the merely accepted.
Cooper (5:43) in an illuminating article rejects the 
whole approach to indoctrination via intention as radically 
misconceived. He criticizes the definitions of both White and 
Snook and their failure to distinguish clearly between the i 
'sincere' and 'insincere' indoctrinator. The sincere indoctrii
I
nator believes that the propositions he is teaching are true 
but the insincere indoctrinator does not, or he thinks that j 
what he is teaching is important for his pupils to believe for 
reasons other than the truth. The point Cooper is making is 
that it is only the insincere indoctrinator who could fit the 
definitions given by White and Snook. The sincere indoctri­
nator, who is most common, does not have the intention to 
indoctrinate 'regardless of the evidence' or in such a way 
that 'nothing will shake that belief' because for him there 
is no evidence to believe in the face of. (5:45) Cooper 
states that the sincere indoctrinator, far from intending that 
his students believe regardless of the evidence or unshakably, 
may insist that if there was genuine evidence against his 
viewpoint then he would want his pupils, and himself, to 
give up their original views. The sincere indoctrinator 
can feel secure in this assertion because he is convinced 
that there is no evidence available. The sincere religious 
teacher, for example, may take just this standpoint
13 |
because he cannot conceive that any evidence could ever be > 
forthcoming against his beliefs.
Perhaps the most telling objection is that Snook makes 
the intention criterion a necessary and sufficient condition 
for indoctrination. Ho thereby rules out the possibility»
A
supported by recent literature , that children can be 
indoctrinated without any Intention on the part of the teacher.
Barrow (3*209) also rejects Snook's argument. He believes 
that it is possible to indoctrinate by omission and that 
intention does not provide a sufficient condition for indoctri­
nation. The example he gives is of an educational system as 
a whole indoctrinating by wh„v they do not do rather than by 
what they do. They achieve this by avoiding altogether the 
question of moral beliefs and their logical status as an area 
of inquiry. The result is that children grow up regarding 
moral beliefs as unquestionable certainties.
4,3 Indoctrination by osmosis
Sociologists of knowledge have helped to enlighten minds
about a new and more pervasive form of indoctrination, that is,
indoctrination by osmosis. They have shown that our most
basic concepts are acquired in a manner which is very difficult
to distinguish from the non-rational methods of indoctrination.
(40;l45) This has helped to create a greater awareness of
subtle influences at work to which we are subject from birth
and from which we derive our understanding and meaning of the
' !
I
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world. It has led to the gradual realization that the 
avoidance of indoctrination in teaching is extremely difficult 
and that the -complete avoidance of it may be well nigh impos­
sible. Stanley (4?) argues that there are four factors which 
make social education appear indoctrinatory, namely, that much 
of what is taught is not grounded in data; in. the fact that 
value preferences are unavoidable in selecting content; in the 
contrived and filtered environment of the classroom and in the 
fact that social education is unavoidably partisan. This form 
of indoctrination makes the ’intention only’ criterion of 
indoctrination appear extremely naive. It raises questions 
as to whether the sharp dividing line between socialisation, 
education and indoctrination, which can be so easily distinguished 
in theory, is all that distinct in practice and whether, in 
fact, there is not an area, however small, where they may be 
completely indistinguishable from each other.
This conception of indoctrination draws attention to the 
necessity to raise the level of consciousness in teachers, 
particularly moral educators so that they become more critically 
aware of what they so often take for granted. It seems that 
this is of paramount importance if intellectual freedom is our 
goal.
This discussion has revealed to me that indoctrination has 
not been well understood by philosophers and it seems that more 
discussion is needed so that educators can come to understand 
its meaning more clearly and know how to avoid it*
Indoctrination is undesirable because it is inimical to 
education. It sets barriers to intellectual freedom and
offends against Kant'a second formulation of the categorical 
imperative: respect for persons, because it reduces the child 
to a means. In whatever way indoctrination is caused the 
final test is what happens to the learner, whether he has or 
has not a closed mind. The child with a closed mind will be 
unable to think critically about the beliefs he holds. He 
will be impervious to rational argument, his beliefs unehakably 
fixed. In this way his freedom and dignity is diminished and 
for this reason indoctrination is to be morally condemned.
It appears that forms of indoctrination are many and 
various and this leaves the matter open-ended rather than 
settled. Conceptions of indoctrination embracing intention, 
content, method and consequence as well as the osmotic con­
ception are all helpful sources to guiding us in identifying 
the many guises of indoctrination. All component parts 
reveal different facets of the concept and neither one can 
stand alone as the sole criterion.
5. MORAL INDOCTRINATION AND MORAL EDUCATION
Moral indoctrination can be grasped more clearly by 
understanding the nature of morality. Morality is concerned 
with values and values, in contrast to facts, cannot be said 
to be either true or false nor is there consensus as to what 
constitutes moral reasons or evidence for a moral claim.
Since no moral beliefs are unquestionably true, indoctri­
nation occurs when unquestioned allegiance is implanted to a 
set of fixed and specific rules. (5:170) The child is brought 
to believe that moral beliefs are unquestionable and he holds 
his beliefs in such a way that he cannot recognise their true
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and logical status. He sees them only as unassailable truths. 
The indoctrinator has succeeded in making the child an instru­
ment of his will with complete disregard for the child's 
rationality. In the light of this Hare's ethical theory can 
be viewed as the complete antithesis to indoctrination founded 
as it is on the logic of moral concepts, certain constraints 
and criticisms which guide rational moral thinking.
Moral education following Hare's system with its 
theoretical and subntantial elements counteracts moral 
indoctrination because it is aimed at examining the status 
of moral beliefs rather than merely inculcating beliefs. It 
seeks to develop the open mind, one which is prepared to engage 
in philosophic dialogue. It aims to develop a true understand­
ing of what kind of evidence is relevant to a particular 
belief and knowledge as to the degree of certainty which is 
appropriate to them. ();21l)
Above all, it is predominantly a rational activity 
enabling the person to subject his beliefs continually to 
critical scrutiny which will enable him to give reasons for 
his commitment to a particular moral position.
CHAPTER TWO 
A.5» NEILL: A LIBERTARIAN VIEW
The Libertarian view regards moral education as unneces­
sary. I intend to show* through an examination of the views 
of A.S. Neill that this philosophy is mistaken and to reveal 
the paradox that leaving the child to chance is more conducive 
to indoctrination than a sound attempt to morally educate. I 
will examine two views of Neill * that the child ia 'born good' 
and that moral education is unnecessary. In the light of 
Hare's ethical theory, I will argue that these two assumptions 
cannot be sustained.
1. The child is born good
Central to Neill's philosophy is the belief that children 
or* by nature virtuous. Neill fiercely rejected the Calvinist 
doctrine of original sin and could never accept its p r e m i s e , 
that man is a sinner in need of redemption* Nor could he 
accept F r e u d 1 a ideas that aggression is i nb or n . That the 
child is 'barn ’ood not b a d ' was a conviction that never 
wave>*ed and became for Neill a 'final t r u t h ,1 ( ?4 i?,)
Neill never produces any argument in support of thin 
belief and by itself it ia extrema ly v a g u e . What docs being 
born good imply and what kind of evidence would be appropriate 
in determining evidence for this claim? Does it mean that the 
child's natural growth ia good or is it referring to his 
desires or perhaps his character? To regard an Infant's 
character as innately good suggests a strain of nativisra 
which is quite gratuitous. On the other hand, what does
18
good mean by our criteria of v a l u e , by Neill's or anyone's?
Perhaps Neill did not really mean 'born good' but rather 'not 
born b a d e' he could be using the words loosely as an appeal 
against the doctrine of original sin. It could then be 
inferred that he meant the child was born in a neutral state.
This position however, destroys his own argument because if it 
depends on environmental influences how the child grows up, 
it cannot also be true that the child will inevitably turr out 
good if he is left to himself. So many questions are raised 
that the statement becomes almost meaningless, expressing at 
most faith in the goodness of humanity rather than a coherent 
rational position.
It does seem to indicate faith in some kind of internal 
principle at work, perhaps a good psychological force in the 
child which will ensure that if he is left to grow in his own 
way, without interference, he will be incapable of evil. But 
there is a contradiction here for if the child is born good 
why does Neill say that given the right conditions, the child 
will inevitably learn what is right - the right conditions 
should be unnecessary if children are born good.
In opposition to the determinism of being born good, one 
cannot help contracting Sarte'c opposed idea that 'existence 
precedes essence' by which he means to say that human beings 
are not determined to be what they are through a fixed human 
nature in which they participate. His view is that it is in 
their nature not to have a nature in this sense but rather \
that their lives are spent in a self-definition which is not 
a matter of discovery but of decision since the option is 
always open to decide otherwise. Even if the existential
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viewpoint seems an exaggeration in its insistence that man is 
nothing else but what he makes himself, it expresses an 
unquestionable truth to which Neill seems blind: that m a n ’s 
course in life is not determined by a fixed nature but rather 
is an op-'n-ended possibility. (9536)
On what grounds can Neill's optimistic and somewhat 
romantic view of human nature be sustained? Neill never explains.
Neill's beliefs reflect an abhorrence of traditional 
religion, one of the sources of his childhood terrors but it 
is also indicative of a failure to come to grips with the 
notion of evil. If people are born good then it is logically 
impossible that evil should ever have arisen in the world.
Neill's view is that evil arises out of the corruption of 
others but if this is correit, his theory allows for no 
explanation of how corruption arises. Neill readily embraces 
ideas of the child's innate goodness but is < >»e unable to 
entertain the possibility of the opposite position, his innate 
badness. This idea that man is capable of evil is not exclusive 
to religious doctrine. William Golding in Lord of the flies 
shows how a capacity for evil cannot be eradicated by a veneer 
of socialisation or schooling. In his satirical attack on 
society he reveals that the tendency to evil is not only 
nakedly evident, but the overriding factor. Neill and Golding 
operate on hunches both expressing opposite sides of the same 
coin. By absolving the child of evil it is almost as though 
Neill also absolves him'of any kind of moral responsibility 
for his actions
The assertions that man is born wholly evil or good is a
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raeh presumption which mirrors only the glimmerings of truth. 
They are dogmatic because they appear to arbitarily single out 
one characteristic as the sole defining trait of human beings, 
whilst excluding others. The belief in the child's intrinsic 
goodness allows no adequate explanation for those promptings 
in the child which we might deem bad by our criteria of value 
such as lying, spitefulness and cruelty. Neill explains them 
purely in psychological terms. The child with criminal 
tendencies, for example, is expressing a perverted form of 
love, not badness. (34:225) In fact, Neill's almost pathologi­
cal avoidance of all notions of morality with regard to the 
child, except where it suite his own philosophy is evidence 
of his selective use of morality.
The difficulty with psychological explanations is that 
they are limited because they cannot account for all instances 
of deviance. To use it, as Neill dost,, to provide a covering 
explanation for all cases of deviance in an oversimplification 
indicative of a tendency t, gen'Taliae. II is rvtdent that 
not all problem children have problem parents, as Neill (24:131) 
so confidently asrertr and neither ore all children's behaviour 
j robl ems directly traceable to unsati-i factory home environment u. 
Neill an 5 hie supporters w o n ' d , nevertoel pen, assert that 
these negative influen-'"s are there, they do exist because 
they must exist. The is-.UH ip then renos ; "rom a rational 
context and becomes one of dogma and faith. In other words, 
it is not merely a causal relationship between the child's 
environment on the one hand and his delinquent behaviour on 
the other that is necessarily at stake in trying to unravel the 
causes for his delinquency but as criminologists suggest a
highly complex matter involving a multiplicity of causative 
factors but also chromosome deviations, hormonal dysfunction 
and various dysfunctions of the nervous system.
Neill's premise in the final analysis is a distortion of 
the truth because it states in absolute terms something which 
is at best uncertain. It expresses faith rather than truth, 
sentiment as opposed to rationality.
Hare's ethical theory illustrates why we could never be 
born good in any absolute sense. This would imply that we had 
perfect moral intuitions or moral knowledge but according to 
Hare, it is only an 'archangel' who has this. We fallible 
human beings are more like 'proles’, extremely vulnerable to 
error. If we were really like archangels, when our moral 
thinking was complete we would find that we all arrived at the 
same conclusion. We know only too clearly that this is not the 
case and that moral disagreement abounds. Possessing neither 
perfect command of the logic of moral concepts, nor the facts, 
and varying in our ability to think critically we all come to 
different conclusions some more rational than others but none 
which we could call perfect.
2. Moral education - is it necessary?
According to Neill, adults have no right to impose their 
notions of good and evil on children. Moral instruction is 
psychologically wrong because it represents a constant stream 
of prohibitions, exhortations and preachments. (27:219) The 
child must be free to find his own morality. That the child 
is capable of doing this is based on Neill's faith in his 
ultimate capacity for 'self-regulation.' Neill's view is
22
that there are two selves in conflict, 'the self that Nature 
made and the self that moral education fashioned.’ (27:222) 
seen in this light, moral instruction and moral education are 
yet another form of indoctrination which contributes to the 
repression of children and the sickness of humanity.
There are a number of objections to this view. Firstly,
it is based on the premise that the child has a right to non­
interference; that he has a right to guide his own development; 
and further, that only he has a right to determine whether 
adult influence is interference or opportunity. This language 
of rights logically presupposes some kinds of rule structure 
because there can only be rights when rules exist. To imply 
that the child has a right to freedom is to claim a moral 
right. (3:144) Neill is appealing to the very presupposed 
system of moral rules which on other occasions he is at pains 
to deny. He is assuming that we share his beliefs that there 
is a system of moral rules binding on all men, for example,
that the child ought to be free and ought to be left to
determine his own life. This appeal to rights has an air of 
finality about it which effectively conceals the fact that 
the moral framework being appealed to is itself questionable.
To substantiate this view that the child has these rights 
would involve substantiating a complete ethical position which 
Neill does not do. That the child has a right to self- 
regulation is not therefore the end of the argument, it is 
the argument itself. The authority with which Neill makes 
these claims is therefore spurious.
The idea that 'Nature' creates a 'real self and that
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therefore all moral guidance must be left to chance is without 
justification. Children cannot find their own morality,they 
cannot create values and make moral choices in a moral vacuum. 
They must first acquire some rudimentary notions of right and 
wrong in their early years. We cannot, in fact, avoid influenc­
ing the young child and the notion of self-regulation in this 
■context is inappropriate.
Hare's ethical theory helps us to see why. Hare recognizes 
that children acquire their moral intuitions in their early 
years from their parents. He sees this as inescapable and not 
without its dangers because moral intuitions are often destruc­
tive reflecting attitudes of bias. Contrary to Neill, Hare 
regards it as necessary to bring children up to acquire moral 
intuitions of the 'right* kind. This is because these senti­
ments form in the child simple reaction patterns which help 
him to cope with the world. Faced with new situations he can 
draw on these learned sentiments; without them he is faced with 
insuperable difficulties because he is totally unprepared.
Each new contingency must be negotiated afresh. We see this 
view and its consequences reflected in extreme forms of 
existentialism and crude forms of act-utilitarianism. Hare 
likens it to driving a car without having learned the basics. 
(2 2:?6)
Neill is adamant, however,that the adult must refrain from 
attempting to promote adherence to certain values because there 
is no need to make this effort. He says: (54:224)
'There is no need whatsoever to teach children how 
to behave. A child will learn what is right and 
wrong in good time - provided he is not pressured.
Learning is a process of acquiring values from the 
environment. If parents are themselves honest and 
moral, then children will, in good time, follow the 
same course.*
It is significant that Dewey recognised what Neill did not, 
that a blind creative force is equally likely to turn out to 
be destructive as it is to be creative. Dewey remarked: (27:403) 
'The idea that goodness of character will come 
without attention to the means of creating it is 
a relic of the belief in magic, for the principle 
of magic is found whenever it is hoped to get 
results without intelligent control of means.'
Neill's rejection of 'intelligent control of means' 
completely overlooks the importance of positive influence 
necessary for the child's growth and faiiLs to consider the fact 
that adults are able to intervene usefully. CroaU- (8:307) 
explains how Neill's inability to live up to his own precepts 
in the upbringing of his daughter resulted in many problems 
for her and the Summerhill community. Neill was forced through 
practical expediency to realise that some adult intervention 
was necessary, nevertheless, he could not bring himself to 
exert that authority. Neill would leave the unpleasant task 
of interference to someone else and would blame his wife if 
anything went wrong. (8:366) Neill failed to recognize the 
paradox that through direction or some restraining influence 
the child may find freedom. His assertion that the child 
should be left alone to discover what is right and wrong 'in 
good time' raises the moral question of why it is illegitimate
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to suggest to the child that some things have been found 
worthwhile and whether this sort of freedom might mitigate 
against the child's eventual happiness. (4?il53) It is not 
cleat* that deliberate initiation into moral resources would 
not promote understanding and prevent some unnecessary suffer­
ing and unhappiness. Nor is it unreasonable to suggest as 
Dearden (10:78) does that 'some grappling with external demands 
are necessary' to enable the child to find himself. To leave 
the child to discover fundamental truths in 'good time', 
whatever that may mean calls into question the very necessity 
for education itself.
Neill's naive belief that a 'free' child would remain 
uncontaminated by the 'neurotic world' outside and would not 
pick up ideas and values of 'moulded' children was refuted by 
his daughter who quickly adopted their language and values in 
spite of being self-regulated, a fact which caused Neill 
considerable apprehension. (8:304)
Neill confuses moral training with moral education. He 
uses these terms interchangeably and it is clear that he can 
see no distinction between them. Hare's system of moral 
thinking allows one to understand why this is so. Neill cannot 
see further than one level of moral thinking, what Hare calls 
the intuitive level. Hare (22:39) makes it clear that although 
the relatively simple principles at the intuitive level are 
necessary for moral thinking, they are not sufficient. Neill 
believed that the children were, in fact, involved in critical 
thinking at their weekly meetings where they decided on the 
rules for the Summerhill community. It is ray contention that
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it is doubtful whether this thinking could be termed truly 
critical, unsupported as it was by guidance or any directing 
principles. Hare believes that critical thinking at the 
second level is thinking which is subject to certain constraints. 
He states that unless moral thinking takes these constraints 
into consideration it is likely to remain on one levels the 
intuitive.
Neill’s rejection of any kind of moral guidance which 
would have enabled the child to do his moral thinking on a 
critical level in the disciplined sense, reveals his inability 
to conceive of any viable alternative to the prescriptive 
morality he abhored. One can appreciate why Neill was quite 
unable to view moral training in any other light than one of 
objectionable moralizing. He did not understand how these two 
levels of moral thinking could interact to support and complement 
each other. We can also understand why Neill believed that the 
environment was the best teacher. Bereft of any theory of how 
moral thinking could best proceed on a critical level and 
blinded by his own misconceptions, he could only believe that 
the environment itself, ’Nature1 was the cure that would lead 
the child along a path of natural growth to moral autonomy 
Moral autonomy, as Hare’s theory reveals, cannot be attained 
without the complementary and supportive role of both the 
intuitive and the critical levels of thinking. Thus, Neill 
failed to provide the child with essential conceptual tools for 
critical thinking to supplement the intuitive level of thinking 
and, in addition, his extremely laissez-faire attitude to the 
child's moral education allow for the possibility of indoctri-
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nation. It is precisely these conceptual tools of critical 
thinking which Hare stresses as essential for rational moral 
thinking which makes his theory anti-indoctrinatory in 
character.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Neill assumes that 
any kind of moral training is wrong and fails to recognize 
that socialisation demands a degree of moral training. Nor is 
it surprising that he failed to see how moral education at the 
second level of thinking could prevent moral training from 
degenerating into moral indoctrination. The cumulative result 
was a complete blindness to the importance of moral training 
by which the child could acquire the correct dispositions and 
moral education by which the child could acquire the critical 
skills which would enable him to subject these dispositions to 
scrutiny.
We cannot, therefore, support the view that the child 
needs no moral direction of any kind. Moreover, it is false 
to assume, as Neill does, that children from good parents 
will automatically follow in their parents’ moral footsteps. 
There seems to be good reasons to take positive steps to direct 
the child’s moral growth, not only for his own sake but for 
others.
The limitations of Neill’s vision is revealed in the 
dichotomy of his thought: either the individual or society; 
either authority or love; either the child’s interests or the 
imposed curriculum; either freedom or repression. These false 
dichotomies are anti-educational because they rule out the 
possibility of compromise, of reconciling these conflicting
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tensions so that they exist in creative tension with each other. 
This is a prerequisite if we are to think of educating the 
child rather than schooling him. It makes no allowance for the 
need to initiate the child into what is regarded as worthwhile 
and fails to consider that the child is in no position to 
judge the values of these social resources because he lacks the 
capacity to discriminate. It dismisses the possibility of the 
adult's role of educative intervention.
Neill has an ambivallent attitude to morality. On the 
one hand he calls for a suspension of moral guidance and moral 
judgements and on the other he is committed to a moral 
absolutism that is expressed in an almost religious vein as he 
castigates 'our sick society.' (34:10) It is ironic that Neill 
who constantly inveighs against making r oral judgements with 
regard to children is unable to refrain entirely from this 
practise himself.
Neill'e attitude to punishment is destructive because it 
threatens to eliminate moral relationships altogether. That 
some punishment can be educative in initiating the child into 
the moral dimension of life is beyond Neill's imagination as 
is the view that punishment presupposes that persons have 
acquired a moral disposition because only moral agents are 
capable of punishing and being punished. He fails to see that 
the purpose of punishment can bo a moral one or to view it in 
any way other than as a manipulative instrument for social 
control. Neill never entertains the idea that moral education 
can help the child understand that punishment does not mean 
getting hurt but rather, may be an external reminder to the
29
offender that he is a morally responsible person who has acted 
in an irresponsible manner. Nor can he recognise that It can 
function as an instrument to lesson hate and open lines of 
communication. Wilson (58:115) points out that if the child 
expects punishment and is not punished when he feels that he 
desires to be, it is likely to lead to negative feelings about 
one's worth as a person. He says further, (58:116)
... ’to the extent that a child, at whatever age 
and stage is beginning to see the moral point, 
rather than to interpret it merely as an attempt 
at psychological coersion, then being punished 
for wrong doing will seem like having the existence 
of a moral order of things, and of one's place in 
it confirmed.'
Neill fails to see ’the moral point* because he conflates 
punishment with hate and he forgets to consider that not being 
punished in such circumstances could lead to bewilderment, 
despair and indifference. This gap in Neill's thinking can be 
understood in the light of his harsh Scottish upbringing. At 
school he lived in constant dread of the ’tawse', a leather 
stiap used for beatings. At home, his father frequently and 
severely meted out punishment in this way, partly to assure 
himself that he was not showing any signs of favouritism to 
his children. Those extremely negative experiences of 
punishment were intensified by constant feelings of anxiety and 
unhappiness coupled with the knowledge that he was a bitter 
failure to his father who continually told him that he would 
'come to nothing,' (8:7-21)
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The claim that the free school does not indoctrinate 
values is difficult to sustain. According to Croalli (8:211) 
'What the children learned at Summerhill was 
determined by Neill's own likes and dislikes 
to a much greater extent than he cared to admit.
No child could really escape his influence however 
free of adult 'moulding' he claimed they were.*
Neill's opposition to new ideas, ('we don't go in for 
suggestions here'), his beleagured stance ist traditional
schooling in the face of change, his inability to cope with 
situations at the school where oth , adults played a prominent 
rol£ and his autocratic attitude to nis staff, allow once more 
for the real possibility of indoctrination.
As one staff member comments: (8:529)
...'one felt hampered and restricted. We were often 
told that we didn't understand the "Summerhillian way 
of doing things" - but there was no machinery to mako 
you more Summerhillian. It was impossible to change 
any practice or even discuss changes however minor:
Neill had set replies and anecdotes to support his 
viewpoint - it was like a religious sect.*
Neill did not provide opportunity for children to think 
critically about the values presupposed in his ideas of 
freedom nor did he accept that these ideas .could differ- from 
his own, particularly in their wanting to make use of their 
freedom in a different way to what he thought appropriate. 
(8:279) He failed to see that moral education can be a 
liberating agent because he shunned educational and ethical 
theory and therefore could see no alternative view. He was
51
a prisoner or orthodoxy in his pedagogy and his barren and 
impoverished conception of .the place of knowledge and 
particularly moral knowledge in education raises the question 
whether he was not also guilty of imposing restrictions on 
children not altogether dissimilar from those which he 
deplored in traditional schooling.
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a prisoner or orthodoxy in his pedagogy and his barren and 
impoverished conception of.the place of knowledge and 
particularly moral knowledge in education raises the question 
whether he was not also guilty of imposing restrictions on 
children not altogether dissimilar from those which he 
deplored in traditional schooling.
CHAPTER THREE 
ETHICAL CULTURAL RELATIVISM
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Relativism wears many faces. Generally speaking it points 
to a form of scepticism. Within philosophical writings various 
definitions are given but this by no means implies that consen­
sus exists as to one universal meaning of the term. My task 
of refuting ethical cultural relativism is thus made more 
difficult.
I am not rejecting partial relativism, the modest claim 
that moral beliefs can be explained by reference to a particular 
cultural c ontext. Partial relativism does not play its hand 
too far. From the fact that moral beliefs arise out of and 
are shaped by the social context it is all too easy to conclude 
that moral beliefs are nothing but cultural norms.
I will attempt to refute this extreme viewpoint by arguing 
that it contains several contradictions and unacceptable 
consequences which render its position untenable. My counter­
argument will be based on the assertion t h a t , in spite of the 
vast diversity of m a n ’s moral beliefs, there exists a moral 
unity of man which can be interpreted in various ways.
Moral relativism is a doctrine which threatens to undermine 
confidence in the belief that moral education is possible. It 
implies, in p r i n c i p l e , that morality can have no rational status 
and thus deprives moral education of its urgency and importance. 
The ethical relativist believes that all moral beliefs are 
relative and to engage in moral education which involves teaching 
moral beliefs as non-relative can only be seen as a form of 
indoctrination. There m u s t , therefore, be something radically 
wrong about attempting to morally educate.
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This doctrine implies two i d e a s , namely, a 'diversity 
thesis', that moral beliefs vary from culture to culture and 
a 'dependency thesis', that moral beliefs depend for their 
validity on a cultural pattern. (29:3) The dependency thesis 
in its extreme form results in a kind of determinism which s.-ys 
that moral beliefs are causally determined by a particular 
culture.
The impetus for this doctrine begins with the recognition 
that a great variety of mor&l beliefs exist in human societies.
It is not mere diversity which is the telling point, it is that 
moral beliefs are incommensurable. They are irreductably 
diverse and therefore in conflict with each other. The same 
action may be considered moral in one society and immoral in 
another and the question whether certain actions are moral or 
immoral cannot be asked.
Anthropologists have documented thin endless diversity of 
beliefs and behaviour to support this fact. They raise 
uncomfortable questions about the normalaey of our own moral 
practices. Ruth Benedict, for example O k 4) describes how the 
society of Dobu are built on traits we would regard as beyond 
the borders of paranoia. In thin society no-one may worx or 
share with another, marriage must be with a deadly foe and a 
good garden crop is viewed as a confession of theft.
Consider too our own society where controversies surrounding 
abortion, nuclear warfare and social equality abound. The 
difficulty is that moral disagreements do not only arise out of 
different accounts of the evidence for a moral claim but out of 
different views as to what constitutes the evidence.
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Thus, given the difficulty of talking about knowledge in 
the moral sphere, the relativist concludes that it makes no 
sense to talk of others h'-ving moral beliefs which are uniquely 
correct because moral knowledge is unattainable. A moral act 
can only be classified with reference to a particular culture.
All moralities are equal and if cultures differ both are right.
Relativism raises crucial questions which I hope to throw 
some light light on in the course of this chapter. Does the diversity 
of man conceal an underlying unity or is it illuaionary? Must 
we tolerate other moralities even if tolerance requires us to 
condone certain practices we would regard as immoral such as 
sacrifice or racism? If not, then are we morally justified in 
trying to impose our own moral principles on peoples of other 
cultures?
Intuitively ethical relativism is extremely plausible and 
fear of relativism is not groundless. Relativism challenges 
customary opinions based on absolute principles. It rouses 
pessimism because it throws old formulae into confusion. It 
raises doubts in our mind: when we look at the seemingly 
irrational moral belimfn that some communities embrace with 
confidence, how can we trust our own? How can we knovj with 
certainty that our way in not an dreadful an we often regard 
others? How can wo know that there in an ideal which arisen 
outside the confines of a particular culture?
The question we muot now aok in what eonoequencoa these 
differences are supposed to carry. The mere fact of differences 
does n o t , in itself, support a relativist thesis. Disagreement 
can result from causes other than rel at iv is mt they can be based
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Thus, given the difficulty of talking about knowledge in 
the moral sphere, the relativist concludes that it makes no 
sense to talk of others having moral beliefs which are uniquely 
correct because moral knowledge is unattainable. A moral act 
can only be classified with reference to a particular culture.
All moralities are equal and if cultures differ both are right.
Relativism raises crucial questions which I hope to throw 
some light light on in the course of this chapter. Does the diversity 
of man conceal an underlying unity or is it illusionary? Must 
we tolerate other moralities even if tolerance requires us to 
condone certain practices we would regard as immoral such as 
sacrifice or racism? If n o t , then are we morally justified in 
trying to impose our own moral principles on peoples of other 
cultures?
Intuitively ethical relativism is extremely plausible and 
fear of relativism is not groundless. Relativism challenges 
customary opinions based on absolute principles. It rouses 
pessimism because it throws old formulas into confusion. It 
raises doubts in our mind: when we look at the seemingly 
irrational moral beliefs that some communities embrace with 
confidence, how can we trust our own? How can we know with 
certainty that our way in not as urnadful an we often regard 
others? How can we know that there in an ideal which arises 
outside the confines of n particular culture?
The question we must now ask is what conooqunnoen throe 
differences are supposed to carry. The more fact of differences 
does n o t , in i t s e l f , support a relativist thesis. Disagreement 
can result from causes other than relativisms they can be based
on beliefs that are f a l s e , biased, the result of ignorance, 
superstition, fear or self-interest. The fact of disagreement 
does not mean that there are no facts of the matter or that it 
is impossible to discover the truth. (4$:128) Conversely, 
agreement can be reached without arriving at the truth. Accord­
ing to Trigg (49:122) this concentration on the psychology of 
individual men, on what they accept or reject results in an 
obsession which obscures the fact that there can be objective 
standards beyond mere opinions.
Another objection is that the relativist's argument lands 
him in a hidden contradiction. If his own doctrine was valid 
not only would it be impossible to resolve disagreement but it 
would be impossible even to formulate them. Agreement becomes 
impossible with those who do not share a framework of similar 
ideas. If moral beliefs were rivals, disagreement could never 
get off the ground because, sharing no criteria of intelligibility, 
comparison would be impossible and there would be no point of 
contact, only mutual incomprehension. Thus, the possibility 
of independently appraising cultures is ruled out and translation 
ticomea impossible.
Anthropologist?' such as Ruth Benedict (4:2) reject the 
notion of the moral unity of man. (cf 25:67) From her view­
point cultural relativism seems to provide compelling reasons 
for adopting the theory of ethical cultural relativism. Her 
message is that morality, as part of a culture, cannot be 
understood or evaluated apart from the distinct world of the 
society to which it belongs. This viewpoint reveals perspective- 
neutrality to be a myth and truth itself relative to cultures.
The question arises, how can enculturated human beings see 
beyond their enculturated screens? The relativist rejects 
realism because it is mired in difficulties. Positivist 
accounts of the world of brute fact waiting to be discovered 
are pipe dreams. He knows that he cannot arrive at a view of 
reality which is not a view from anywhere within it. Hence 
his conclusion: there cannot be a rational basis for claiming 
that a moral belief is more correct, true or justified than 
another. Neither can there be objective standards by which 
the moralities of other cultures can be judged, indeed, it 
makes no sense to do so. Bach culture must be understood in 
terms of the values shared by members of that society.
The problem is that in correctly rejecting a strong form 
of absolutism the relativist also rejects a plausible weaker 
universalism which suggests that even though we are enculturated 
we are not imprisoned behind our screens so that all we ever 
do is work out the implications of ourselves. His position 
forces him to some bewildering contradictions and nihilistic 
consequences.
On this view truth and logic are at risk. Truth is made 
to depend on what cultures happen to believe. It arises from 
th', collective agreement of a culture and the idea that things 
can be that way whether cultures think they arc or not, cannot 
be sustained. Confronted with differing moral beliefs which 
appear irrcsoluble it appears that truth and logic cannot 
decide the issue because they themselves are tied to particular 
cultures. They can only en envoked after sides have been 
taken, '.he difficulty is that the distinction between
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rationally and irrationally held beliefs becomes blurred and 
we are led to the absurd conclusion that there is no distinction 
between education and indoctrination and that attempts at 
moral education are futile.
Another objection is that the r el ativist’s doctrine is 
literally incredible and no human being could possibly believe 
it. We are required to believe that in every situation of 
moral choice contrary judgements of right and wrong are equally 
legitimate. This means that cannibalism, infanticide, incest; 
ritual murder and acts of self-sacrifice are equally legitimate 
because no one judgement is more true or rationally justified 
than another. We are required to suspend doubt and discussion 
about moral matters because moral conflict is pointless. These 
consequences are unacceptable. If moral beliefs are to be 
causally explained then there are no reasqns unless there are 
onuses and we have to lose ourselves os agents because the link 
between rational i ty and morality is severed. Reason itself is 
dethroned and this move makes irrationality i mj ©asible,thua 
nationality must be on illusion. An Hollis says (<??: 8?), ...
'the difficulty is that there are too many ways of making the 
actors world rational from w i t h i n . ’ The question of rational 
reasons for m o ”al choices does, not arise and since all we are 
engaged in ie navel gazing, the notion of impartiality becomes 
meaningless.
This view invites anarchy because it in contrary to what 
wo regard as moral. On the r el a t i v i s t ’ a view, morality must 
be viewed as having no propositions! content and we must believe 
that the emotive moral issues over which endless debates rage,
is carried out in a vacuum. Our most important moral decisions 
must be regarded au the result of arbitary choice and that all 
moral arguments in which we urgently appeal to the relevant 
facts to-provide grounds for our viewpoint are based on illusion. 
This implies that there xs no such thing as a justified moral 
conclusion.
We must believe that what we call 'morally g o o d ' is to be 
identified solely with the mores of our society. This flies 
in the face of common sense and of crucial aspects of what we 
understand by moral goodness. When we say that something is 
morally good we mean that something is good about it Independent 
of subjective and cultural conditions. The point is that if we 
arc engaged in moral discourse there are limits as to what can 
count as morally g o o d . There are inherent features of morality 
itself that make it difficult to regard morality as relative.
The element of universality, for example, which in preoeiI in 
any morality makes it applicable to other persons and other 
cultures, not jno' to ouryalvos. Moral judgements, if regarded 
aw relative lose their statu-, aw moral statements and become 
mere deccrlptlvc statem-'nts with their normative component 
neutralize!. The difficulty m  that if we cannot admit that 
moral judgements imply obligations, not juct for me, but for 
others in like oireumatanoen, then we cannot distinguish moral 
utterances from other utterances. Thus, moral relativism in 
impossible. It does not make sense to assume *,;hat I care 
nothing whether others share my views or whether I see myself 
as laying no obligations on anyone. Moral discourse seeks 
to persuade and prescribe. There are qualities of moral
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statements that set limits to the g a m e ; what can be said and 
done in its name. The moral relativist cannot ignore those 
limits and still claim to be playing the same game.
The prescriptive quality of moral judgements has been 
emphasised by R.M. Hare. He views ethical judgements as more 
closely related to commands then statements of fact. Although 
his theory is a non-cognitive o n e , he is not taking a crude 
subjective view nor is he, in denying a strong form of 
absolutism: a realm of ethical facts which is part of the real 
world existing quite independently of ourselves, embracing 
ethical relativism. According to Hare, ethical judgements are 
not immune from criticism and reason has a role to play so 
that we can ever conclude that any ethical judgement is just 
os good as
The tolerant he relativist appears to extent to
other moral bell „ i is an admirable motive but it is not 
admirable in practice. The problem is that he reduces the 
notion of respect for others to agrees with. Why should we 
respect other moral beliefs if this implies exploitation, lies 
or superstition? Respect has little to do with agreement and 
the idea that because moral beliefs differ they must be given 
blanket endorsement is Invalid. While we are not justified in 
imposing our views on others neither is it valid to adopt a 
relativist indifference to divergent moral beliefs. This 
attitude cannot be squared with our moral responsibility as 
human beings which involves making moral judgements, (of 23:91) 
This attitude invites moral chaos because it allows each person 
and each culture to become their own legitimating authority.
Thus, while the relativist appears to b championing the 
right of everyone to hold to their own W  ral views, it does 
not mean that we ought to agree with him. This indiscriminate 
form of tolerance legitimises equally what is desirable and 
undesirable and because it fails to uphold the principle of 
non-contradiction, ends up in nihilism. Posing as a neutral 
arbiter between views, it clashes with those views which do not 
allow a neutral arbiter such as the universalist and transcen­
dental claims of a Christian or Islamic. The result is that it 
impales itself in yet another contradiction.
The right which the relativist champions for everyone to 
uphold their own moral beliefs is not, paradoxically, a view 
which he can uphold as a right because to do this is to put 
himself into a self-refuting position: by absolutising itself 
it becomes incoherent.
Self-refutation, according to Passmore (35180) is evident 
when we have to regard a statement as 1 at once being possibly 
true and as not being possibly true.' He states that in 
discourse we cannot renounce the claim to be making true 
statements. Similarly, the relativist, when he states his 
claim for relativity cannot deny that he is asserting it to be 
true. Therefore, in order to level the accusation of self- 
refutation we must note whether his claim violates the 
principles of discourse.
The relativist says that 1 right1 means no more than right 
for a given society and therefore that it is wrong for anyone 
to interfere or condemn the values of other societies. (55:3^) 
His premise, however, is contradicted by his conclusion. For,
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if what is right is only relative to a culture then it is 
clear that his conclusion is not presented as something that 
can be seen as relative to a culture, r a t h e r , it is presented 
as something which has a higher epistemic status. In other 
words, figuratively s p e ak in g , he steps out of his relativist 
framework into an absolute position, which his theory disallows. 
Put in another w a y , his position is indefensible because in 
order to make a coherent sta te me nt , the relativist must take 
the non-relative option. In order to say that ethical 
cultural relativism is true, the relativist must presuppose a 
non-relative framework. But this, in turn, presupposes 
relativism is false and what results is an oscillation of truth 
and falsity within the same context of meaning which results 
in incoherence. Not only is the message confused because of 
these conflicting elements but what it is trying to say cannot 
be expressed. He does violate the principles of discourse 
because the conflation of truth and falsity is incompatible 
with the invariant conditions of discourse* It is absolutely 
self-refuting because he is asserting and denying the same 
fact at the same time.
My argument rests on the assertion that there exists a 
concept of the moral unity of man. This unity may be under- 
stood from a number of perspectives. Jarvio (25:108),
Atkinson (1:14) and MacIntyre (^1:169) offer various inter­
pretations. Warnock (50:71-95) p r o vi de s , to my mind, a most 
plausible interpretation. Hie penetrating insight into the 
complexities involved enable one to understand the problem of 
rel at iv is m , yet not be compelled to accept it.
He argues (,$0 :87) that there are four fundamental moral 
principles: non-maleficence, fairness, beneficence and non­
deception which counteract the deletrious liabilities inherent 
in the limitedness of human sympathies. These basic principles, 
he says, have to be accepted as independent principles which 
are not reducible to one another or to anything else. This 
implies two important points. Firstly, that there cannot be 
a single rationale behind morality or one single fundamental 
moral principle, as Kant or the Utilitarians would have it.
There may, however, be one general end in view but there is not 
just one means to that end. It is important to remember that 
this end cannot be equated to specific goals, a certain life­
style or tell us how we ought to live. We should understand it 
rather as something wnich sets limits to our conduct, as 
prescribing certain conditions within which our lives are to 
be lived. ($0:f‘/H) It is obvious that within the broad specifica­
tions of 'the moral point of v i e w 1 a wide diversity of different 
ends and means are possible. Morality cannot offer a complete 
answer to the question of how we ought to live because, says 
War n o c k , it constitutes only a part of the 'Good L i f e 1 and there 
are many different non-moral principles which alno come into 
play.
Secondly, the indenen'iwuco of those moral principles means 
that they can conflict. It may bo impossible to find grounds in
support of one view rather than another. Recognizing the 
independence of these moral principles means recognizing the 
possibility of 'irreooluble p er plexity.1 It is this irresoluble 
perplexity which the relativist no readily recognizee and plays 
upon. W a r n o c k 'n interpretation of thin phenomenon is illuminating.
He says (50:89) that we should not be particularly appalled by 
this conclusion for he knows of no reason for supposing that 
this irresoluble perplexity is typical of moral decisions or 
that the typical terminal process in morals is that of arbitary 
choice. This means that we can, at least, most of the time 
resolve our moral conflicts and that our moral decisions can be 
the result of a reasoned thinking process. Tltis important 
truth has significance for my argument for it means that we 
can and ought to recognize not only the diversity in moral 
beliefs but also the possibility of irresoluble perplexity. 
Nevertheless, this concession can be viewed as compatible with 
the idea of the moral unity of man.
Thus, even if we grant the validity and importance of 
certain aspects of the relativist's arguments and even if 
we acknowledge the possibility of irresoluble perplexity in 
moral matters, it still does not follow that there is a simple 
inference from the fact of moral diversity and moral dilemmas 
to a moral relativism in which anything goes and by which we 
must concede that because the Australian tribesmen do it, it 
mu«t be right for them, (cf 14:93) What is right cannot merely 
mean ordained by any given society although what a society's 
conventions ordains will be regarded as right in that society. 
It is the blurring of this crucial distinction which makes 
ethical cultural relativism unacceptable as a doctrine for 
moral education.
CHAPTER FOUR
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A RATIONAL BASE FOR MORAL EDUCATION
Finding a rational base for moral education is absolutely 
essential because unless moral thinking is based on a rational 
method which gives a purchase on the notion of truth, we are 
defenseless against the charge of indoctrination.
X will consider three ethical theories. My aim is to show 
that intuitionism and emotivism are unsatisfactory theories for 
moral education because they deny morality a rational status. 
Hare's ethical theory will be suggested and briefly outlined 
as a plausible answer to the problem.
If the relativist's subjective position is invalid, as I 
have argued, the question arises as to how far we can go in 
the opposite direction in claiming objective grounds for our 
moral convictions. This is not an easy question to answer 
and necessitates an examination of the nature of morality.
The Logical Positivists revealed a crucial distinction 
between empirical judgements and judgements of value. Empirical 
judgements, they said, are meaningful and can be verified by 
empirical observation, by sense experience. Value judgements 
are 'meaningless' since they cannot be tested for their 
correctness in the same way. To think that we can is to fail 
to recognise a fundamental logical difference which non- 
cognitive moral views insist on, namely, the gap between (moral) 
values and fact. It is to confuse the status of values with 
the status of facts, (of 1:11$) The interminable argument in 
moral philosophy is evidence to the fact that moral philosophers 
can go on arguing forever precisely because moral values cannot 
be objectively justified in the same way as empirical facts can.
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The status of morality reveals that moral knowledge is not 
attainable in any empirical sense. Perhaps, however, it is 
possible to maintain a weaker claim to moral knowledge in terms 
of A.Je Ayer's third criterion for knowledge, namely, 'Being 
able to give an appropriate answer to the question; how do you 
know that x?' (24:101) An appropriate answer could be one 
which could be rationally justified; backed with relevant 
reasons, which are not inconsistent, the consequences of which 
we would be prepared to accept ourselves. (3:63)
In moral education the question we are confronted with is: 
'How, if at all, is it possible to know what is right?' How 
can we legitimately prescribe what ought to be regarded as 
morally good if value judgements are neither true nor false 
and at best contentious? This is an extremely difficult 
question which has taxed moral philosophers and moral educators. 
In the search for moral knowledge various ethical views have 
arisen. I will examine three positions in order to discover 
whether they throw any light on the abovementioned question.
1. INTUITIVISM
This view is put forward by G.E. Moore. The real question 
of ethics he said is, 'What is the property for which good 
stands?' (51*5) His answer was that good is indefinable, like 
yellow, and by means of the 'open-question argument' he sought 
to show that good is simple and analy/sable. Goodness, he said, 
was a non-natural property and anyone who attempted to define 
good in terms of natural prorerties committed what he called 
'the naturalistic fallacy.' On this view, all moral questions
are ultimately concerned with the possession or non­
possession of one quality: goodness, which could only be 
recognised by moral intuition. It is an attempt to show that 
moral judgements are different from assertions of fact, 
expressions of taste or aesthetic judgements but as a claim to 
objective knowledge it fails.
Firstly, even if one acknowledges some truth in this view, 
there is no check beyond intuition about what is or is, not the 
case. Further, when moral disagreements arise and both persons 
claim to have intuited the correctness of their view there is 
no way in which the question could be settled. Bach person 
could claim that the other person’s intuition was defective 
and the intuitions themselves could never settle the matter.
In fact,the intuitionist begins to look very much like the 
relativist. It seems that in the final analysis he must also 
concede that moral judgements are matters of taste relative to 
Individuals or to cultures.
To claim that intuition is an accredited route to knowledge 
is obviously fantastic and it is evident that what this claim
amounts to is perhaps little more than an accurate guess. If
we remember A.J. Ayer’s third criterion of knowledge, what 
answer could I give to the question; 'How do you know that x?’, 
except to reply; 'by intuition.' It is clear that this answer
is inappropriate for it tolls me nothing more than that I
believe something to be the case.
Moral education viewed from an intuitionist squint is 
almost indistinguishable from indoctrination. It seems to 
imply the absurd view that facts are irrelevant for a moral
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judgement, Moral education becomes devoid of content and the 
teacher becomes powerless to answer his pupils’ searching 
questions. The teacher is committed to inculcating beliefs 
based on his own idiosyncratic opinion reflecting the limitations 
of his own vision. There could be no question of ’intelligent 
believing’ since the teacher would be unable to offer the child 
any rationale which would enable him to understand why a moral 
belief should be accepted or rejected, (of 18:25) It would 
require the persuasiveness of the teacher's personality or the 
fear of his authority to convince the child of the veracity of 
certain beliefs.
Intuitioniem would rule out all discussion and argument. 
Pupils would undoubtedly feel that morality referred to 
mysterious supersensible properties %f action or affairs, 
inexplicable, divorced from their own conduct, requiring an 
act of faitn: the belief that if one concentrated clearly for 
a moment the truth would suddenly dawn.
The problem is that the child's mind would be firmly 
closed as critical thinking would be impossible. Every moral 
educator would also be an indoctrinator since he could give no 
rational account to his pupils why certain moral beliefs should 
be accepted or rejected or why they ought to act in one way 
rather than another. He would be engaged in creating what 
Green (18:5?) aptly calls 'a non-evidential' style of believing 
which he equates with indoctrination.
2. EMOTXVISM
According to A.J. Ayer who launctud this theory, a value
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judgement does not qualify as a meaningful statement at all. It 
is neither analytic nor empirical and cannot therefore be verified. 
It is therefore not possible to argue about questions of value. 
(53:48) It follows that when two persons offer differing moral 
views it is impossible for them to disagree with each othex.
All these persons are doing is expressing ethical feelings. 
Expressions of feelings are not assertions* they do not have 
cognitive content therefore they cannot contradict each other. 
Emotivism amounts to what Raphael (39:26) calls the 'hurray-boo 
theory', because moral judgements are reduced to either expressions 
of approval or disapproval.
C.'L. Stevenson’s form of emotive theory is less extreme than 
Ayer's. He recognised that genuine agreement and disagreement 
was possible within moral discourse. He drew the distinction 
between beliefs and attitudes and put forward the idea that moral 
judgements 'evince' attitudes not belief. He saw moral discourse 
as characterised chiefly by its purpose: 'to create an influence.' 
(24:121) Moral judgements, he said, do not add to or change the 
belief of the person addressed, rather they influence his attitude 
and conduct. Moral discourse is not informative but Influential, 
modifying attitudes primarily and beliefs only incidently. (51:23) 
(of 52:60)
Emotivism explains emotive involvement in moral judgements 
but in its failure to recognise the cognitive element it denies 
that morality may involve truths which can be known. (53:294)
Moral education according to this model would become just 
as unaccoptabJ e as the intuitioniat model. The teacher would 
be concerned with influencing the child's attitude, not his
belief. One could almost regard him in the role of a propaganda 
expert as he persuades and cajoles his pupils without any 
recourse to rational argument. This would rule out the 
possibility of any degree of neutrality on the teacher’s part 
or autonomy on the pupils.
To close one’s mind to the importance of the evidence and the 
facts necessary for making and evaluating moral beliefs and to 
locate all its importance solely in its effects is to mislead 
the child once more into thinking that morality has nothing 
whatever to do with reason.
Since the teacher would judge his success by how effectively 
he had been able to win the child's allegiance rather than by 
how he had enabled him to think rationally or for himself, his 
role would be similar to the one described by Kilpatrick (26:48) 
as 'gaining converts to his partisan cause' - a form of tyranny 
over the mind indicative of indoctrination. It calls to mind 
Kant's principle of respect for persons. In omitting to give 
reasons for the child's impersonal consideration he is treated 
as a moans: an instrument of someone else1a will without regard 
for his rationality.
5. PRBSOBIPTIVISM
This theory developed by R.M. Hare emphasizes that the 
meaning of moral language is revealed in the use to which it is 
put. It has some affinities with emotiviom but differs from 
it in important respec'e. Hare, like the emotiviats, rejects 
all forms of desoripbivism, the view that moral judgements can 
be logically equivalent to factual statements. The model for
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moral judgements in this theory is the imperative in all its 
ramifications: commands, resolves, general commands and rules.
The prescriptivist view is often misunderstood. It is not 
saying that moral judgements are imperatives but rather that 
they are like them and that there is an Irreductible evaluative 
or prescriptive element in moral thinking. (22:6) The study of 
imperatives is therefore a useful point of departure for under­
standing moral philosophy. It should also be understood that 
prescriptiviem does not, as many critics claim, say that all 
moral judgements perform the same speech act, that they 
prescribe in the sense opposed to advise or counsel. The term 
•prescribe1 is used as a general term to cover a variety of 
speech acts which have many differences among them but one 
common element, that of guiding action.
It is my contention that Hare's recent universal prescriptive 
theory of ethics makes ample provision for the rational character 
of moral discourse and because of this can provide a rational 
base for moral education. It can provide an acceptable answer 
to the problem of how it is possible to educate morally without 
indoctrination,,
I will briefly outline Professor Haro's recent ethical theory 
which is presented in Moral Thinking, published in 1981 and also 
consider very briefly some criticisms against this view.
In this book Hare introduces two new developments in his 
moral theory. He has introduced these two developments to 
tighten up the thought processes involved in rational moral 
thinking. Hare develops more strongly two elements: the 
element of constraint and the element of criticism. The element
51
of constraint refers to those thought procest one has to go 
through in rational moral thinking. The element of criticism 
refers to the sorts of criticism to which these thought proces­
ses are open.
3.1 The element of constraint
3.1.1 The constraint of ’logic and the facts'.
According to Hare, rational moral thinking requires a 
command of two considerations: logic and the facts. By logic, 
Hare means the logical properties of the distinctive concepts 
of which moral judgements are framed, in particular those 
connected with the word 'ought.' By 'the facts', Hare means 
those fauts which are available in any situation in which moral 
judgement is being passed, especially about how what is done 
will affect those others concerned.
Hare did not deny the emotivist view that in morality we 
are free to decide what principles we shall adopt and this view 
has been severely criticised by many philosophers who hold that 
morality should not be a master of choice but somehow founded 
on the nature of things. I will briefly touch on this aspect in 
the last chapter. Hare said only that once we have adopted 
certain principles, morality requires us to be rational in our 
adherence to them. This means firstly, that we m wit try to 
didcern what the logical rules are in accordance with which our 
principles must be adopted if they are to qualify as moral ones. 
Secondly, that wo should try to discover the relevant facts of 
a situation when deciding whether or not it comes under any ,f 
cur principles. (24?h01-405)
3.1.2 The logical properties of moral concepts
Hare singles out two properties of moral concepts, namely, 
prescriptivity and universality. What Hare means by prescripti- 
vity is for e xample, that 'ought' guides choices. If 1 say to 
someone, 'You ought not to steal but do so anyhow', it would 
be very odd. Normally when I use the word ought I am implying 
an imperative and in this sense my statement is prescriptive. 
(21:172) As regards universality, Hare states that it ij a 
characteristic of moral judgements that we must be prepared to 
give reasons for them. Again, it would be very odd if I said,
'You ought not to steal but I have no reason for saying that.' 
According to Hare, mere consistency in regarding something as 
a reason is not enough. The reasons given for moral judgements 
must have a higher degree of universality. They must be what 
he calls ''U-t yp e 1 ones, that is, ones which do not contain 
any reference to a particular individual.
In making moral judgements I would combine the two aspects 
as follows. Firstly, I would imaginatively put myself in each 
person's place, asking in t u r n , 'How muoh do I want to have this 
or avoid that?' Thus, I identify with his prescriptions. This 
is the application of the principle of prescriptivity. (22:9?)
Secondly, I ask myself, would I be prepared to consider 
each person's interest, giving them all equal weight? Hare 
calls this 'going the round of all affected par ti es . ' (20:123)
This is the application of the principle of universality together 
with an appeal to interest or inclination. In this way, accord­
ing to Har e , I can imaginatively weigh up cumulative satisfactions 
and come to some decision. Hare recognizes that it is not only
moral judgements, that are universal disable but also other 
kinds such as aesthetic ones. Nevertheless, Hare affirms 
that in the majority of cases prescriptivity and universality 
are sufficient to guide us in adopting certain moral principles 
as long as our moral judgements are confined to those situations 
whets*e the interests of other people are affected.
3.1.3 The facts
The reasons which are given for a moral judgement must be 
assessed for their truthfulness. We would also be required by 
the universality principle to go the round of the affected 
parties to determine who exactly will be affected by the act 
under consideration. Prescriptivity would require us to 
identify with the preferences of the affected parties raising 
the question of what, in fact, these preferences are. Hare 
recognizes that We cannot possibly know all the facts but 
emphasises that rational moral thinking requires us to 
consider those which we can discover. (22:159)
In a nutshell, what Hare means by our freedom to reason 
is the freedom to think in conformity to the correct logical 
canons which are determined by the meanings of moral words 
coupled with as full awareness as possible of the facts of a 
given situation. Hare is n-_ ying that a moral judgement 
is any kind of descriptive tiv. .jeraent in the sense that we 
need only get at objective faces in order to know whether 
our moral judgements are true or false.
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3.2 The element of criticism
3.2.1 The two-level theory
Hare draws a distinction between intuitive and critical 
thinking. Both these levels are concerned with moral questions 
of substance but differ in the way they handle them. (22:25-26) 
Hare explains these two levels through the notion of moral 
conflict. If moral thinking is confined to the intuitive level, 
then moral conflicts cannot be resolved. This is because this 
level may have no determined procedure for settling these 
conflicts or if it has, the principles involved will be of ever 
increasing complexity. (22:35) Hare does not dismiss the 
importance of the intuitive level of moral thinking. He recog­
nizes that some simple non-contentious guidelines are necessary 
in the form of ’prima facie principles* or universal prescriptions 
and that much moral thinking is intuitive and descriptive.
However, he regards it as only one level of moral thinking: the 
level of received opinion and unquestioned principle. He 
states (22:39) that although the prima facie principles used at 
the intuitive level are necessary for human thinking, they are 
not sufficient. Intuitionlsm cannot resolve moral conflicts, 
as we have already seen, (cf 22:40)
•Critical thinking at a second level enables one to resolve 
these conflicts at the intuitive level and indeed? if we do not 
our thinking will be incomplete. (22:26) Critical thinking 
involves making a choice (a ’decision of principle*) under 
certain constraints: those imposed by the logical properties 
of moral concepts and by the non-moral facts, and says Hare,
•by nothing else.* (22:40)
3.2.2 Archangels and proles
Hare outlines the characteristics of archangels and proles. 
In this allegorical way he clarifies the essential difference 
between these two levels of thinking. He emphasizes that these 
two kinds of moral thinking are not rival procedures, they are 
both elements in a common structure each having its own part 
to play. (22:44)
The archangel is an extreme kind of person# He has super­
human powers of thought and knowledge and absolutely no trace 
of human weaknesses. Being free from both intellectual and 
character defects his critical thinking would enable him to 
reason effectively in any situation. After scanning the 
relevant properties and the consequences of certain actions he 
would be able to frame a universal principle, perhaps even a 
highly specific one, suitable for action" in that situation.
Nor would he be detracted from acting on that principle by any 
human weaknesses or other partialities. (22:44-4$)
The very opposite of the archangel is the prole who has 
human weaknesses to an extreme degree. He has to rely solely 
on intuition, sound prima facie principles and good dispositions 
to guide him mince he is completely unable to think critically. 
The only way he can gain knowledge of the facts is from others, 
either by education or imitation.
In each of us, says Hare (22:45) there is part archangel 
and part prole# Our moral thinking is a mixture of both in 
varying degrees therefore it is not surprising that wo all come 
to different conclusions. Hare maintains that if we could all 
think like archangels we would all arive at a perfect command of
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logic and the facta and that this would constrain our moral 
evaluations so severely that in practice we would all come to 
the same conclusions. (22:46)
3.2.3 The relationship between the two levels 
In order to explain the relationship of the two levels 
Hare recalls Aristotle's famous metaphor which reveals the 
relationship of the intellect, to the character to be paternalist­
ic. This applies to the relationship between critical and 
intuitive thinking and it means that in so far as a man's 
dispositions are rational, it is because 'they listen to reason 
as to a father.' (22:46) Thus, intuitive thinking cannot be 
self-supporting, whereas critical thinking can be and is therefore 
epistemologically prior. (22:46)
Hare believes that moral evaluative principles have to be 
differentiated from other kinds by the fact that they are 
prescriptive, universalizable and overriding. (22:53) To treat 
a principle as overriding is to always let it override other 
principles when they conflict with it. (22*56)
Hare admits that his account of moral principles as over­
riding other principles would make it impossible for a moral 
principle to be overriden by another moral principle or by a 
non-woral principle. Yet, he notes (22:5?) that, in fact, both 
cases occur. In the first instance there are moral conflicts 
resolved by allowing one moral principle to override another 
and other instances where we 'take a moral holiday', where through 
weakness of will or just plain desire, I deliberately opt to do 
what I desire without considering others. In other words, I
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allow a non-moral prescription to override a moral one.
It appears, prima facie, that there is an element of 
contradiction in Hare's account of the overridingness of moral 
principles. The question arises: how is it possible for moral 
principles to be overridable and yet not overridable?
Hare's answer is that the whole structure of moral thinking 
consists of two levels, namely
. universal prescriptive principles which a person, does 
not allow to be overriden. Hare calls them 'critical 
moral principles' and they are underived, functioning 
at the critical level. They are also capable of being 
made so specific that they do not need to be overriden; 
and
. prima facie principles which are overridable and which 
are selected by critical thinking during which use is 
made of principles of the first subclass. In other 
words, prima facie principles are derived at the 
intuitive level and are selected as a means to the 
ends of underived ones. (22:60)
The interaction of the two levels is as follows. The moral 
thinker at the second level of critical thought selects from 
the first level those Intuitive principles which are useful to 
his critical thinking. These prima facie principles are 
selected by critical thinking according to their 'acceptance 
utility.' By this term Hare means that they are selected on 
the grounds that 'general acceptance of them will lead to 
actions which do as much good, and as little harm, as possible.' 
(22:62) According to Hare, acceptance utility is the only
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intuitive level and are selected as a means to the 
ends of underived ones. (22:60)
The interaction of the two levels is as follows. The moral 
thinker at the second level of critical thought selects from 
the first level those intuitive principles which are useful to 
his critical thinking. These prima facie principles are 
selected by critical thinking according to their 'acceptance 
utility.' By this term Hare means that they are selected on 
the grounds that 'general acceptance of them will lead to 
actions which do as much good, and as little harm, as possible.' 
(22:62) According to Hare, acceptance utility is the only
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feasible justification for their use. What this means is that 
it is the overridingness of the deliverances of critical 
thinking which makes derived principles and underived principles 
moral ones. (24:427)
The important point which emerges from this theory is that 
everything in moral thinking is subordinate to critical thinking 
because it is only the principles derived through critical 
thinking that have overriding status. We can understand now 
how the critical level lends it support to the intuitive and how 
it holds the two levels together.
4. CRITICISMS OF BARB'S ETHICAL THEORY
Hare's ethical theory is a sophisticated form of utilitarian­
ism and many of the objections against utilitarianism can once 
more be raised against his theory. In Moral Thinking Hare 
devotes several chapters to a defence of these criticisms.
Against Hare's prescriptive theory many voices are raised.
Space does not permit me to consider Hare's defence of his 
position. I would like, however, to briefly consider two 
common criticisms.
Critics in general dispute Hare's belief that the central 
and most important use of moral language is prescriptive. They 
wrongly attribute to him the view that the close connection 
between moral judgements and actions can be explained solely by 
this mere fact. Hare, however, does not imply that the 
prescriptivity of moral judgements is the only conceivable 
account of the connection between moral judgements and action.
Hare means to say that if moral judgements are prescriptive, this 
will explain the intimate connection they seem to have with
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actions, (of 24:206) (22:208) Hare agrees that not all moral 
judgements need to be prescriptive and that some of them are 
simply descriptive. (22:21)
As regards the principle of universality there are many 
criticisms, (of 51:34) A common one is that it overlooks the 
extremely complicated character of most of the situations in 
which moral issues arise, (cf 24:210) This criticism ignores 
the fact that Hare has stated that a moral judgement may be 
universalisable, yet, at the same time very -specific, (cf 20: 
40-41)
There are three major criticisms directed against Hare's 
notion of 'logic and the facts.'
The first argument is against Hare's assumption that it is 
logically possible to put oneself in the place of another to 
the extent required by the logical properties of moral concepts. 
This requires a complete identification with others and as Hare 
himself phrases it: 'Would it any longer be mo?' The problem 
is that it is self-contradictory to suppose that I could become 
someone else. (22:119)
Hare's reply (22:96-97) is that although it is impossible 
for Smith to become Jones, it is not impossible for Smith to 
imagine being Jones. This implies Imagining himself with 
Jones' preferences.
According to Hare, when I Identify with someone by calling 
them 'I', I am already prescribing their satisfactions. Thus 
Hare contends that '!' has a prescriptive element in its meaning 
and therefore that this identification is a prescriptive one. 
(22:221) Hare says further, (22:223) that since 'morality
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admits no relevant difference between 'I* and ’he', I am 
bound unless I become an amoralist, to prescribe that his 
pr.ef«rencee be satisfied. Whilst Hare agrees that this may be 
psychologically difficult, he rejects the suggestion that it 
is logically impossible.
The second criticism against Haro's ethical theory is that 
it presupposes that all satisfactions or dissatisfactions are 
homogeneous as regards their moral significance. This is 
falsei say his critics, because it assumes that all we are 
required to do is to calculate the cumulative satisfactions or 
dissatisfactions after going the round of the affected parties, 
and base mr decisions on this. Moral judgements, they argue, 
cannot be quantified in this way.
Hare never denies that satisfactions are of different kinds 
but he contends that it is possible to know what cumulative 
satisfactions would be preferred in this or that concrete 
situation regardless of the differences there might be in the 
kinds of satisfactions. (24:414)
The third criticism levelled against Hare is that he has 
landed himself in descriptivism or naturalism because of his 
account of the constraints of logic and the facts.
Hare (22:218) defines a descriptivist as someone who 
thinks that moral judgements are descriptive and that for a 
statement to be descriptive is for its meaning to determine its 
truth conditions. Naturalism, according to Hare (22:186) is 
the theory that solely from certain factual statements, certain 
moral judgements can be made.
The objection is that Hare, by appealing to the meaning 
of moral words and thus to the logic of moral concepts has set
up a system of moral reasoning which compels certain moral 
principle® to be adopted and others to be rejected. (22:218)
I* seems as though the truth of a moral judgement follows 
from the meaning of words and that he is offering an account 
of moral thinking which is indistinguishable from the 
descriptiviats.
Hare meets this criticism in two ways. First, through the 
logical possibility of amoralism which, says Hare, establishes 
his ’bona fides1 as a non-descriptivist. This is because the 
logical possibility of amoralism leaves open the further 
possibility of being able to either accept or reject any 
universal prescription or prohibition. (22:219) What this 
means, in fact, is that we can think in accordance with the 
logic and the facts but we are not compelled to adopt any 
universal prescription or prohibition which may arise. On the 
deacriptivist or naturalist account that possibility would be 
non-exietent. Hare is thus allowing for what he calls an 
'escape route' from his prescriptiviam. (22:183)
Secondly, Hare counteracts the suggestion that he is 
inferring value judgements from matters of empirical fact: 
that he takes what would maximize preference satisfactions of 
the affected parties to determine what ought to be done, by 
explaining that in going the round of the affected parties, we 
are identifying with the other person's preferences as moral 
thinking requires us to do. This does not mean that we are 
describing facta but rather that we are assenting to certain 
prescriptions. To weigh in the balance what would maximize 
the satisfactions of these preferences is not to describe any
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factual state of affairs, a misconception which his critics 
are under, but to assent to certain prescriptions. Thus, to 
•come to the conclusion that a certain act ought to be done 
is not to infer s, moral judgement from a fact but from a 
prescription and this means that Hare cannot be guilty of 
the descriptiviem or naturalism of which his critics nccuse 
him.
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THE IMPLICATIONS OF HARE'S ETHICAL THEORY 
FOR MORAL EDUCATION
Hare's aim was to find a system of moral reasoning which 
could be used to answer moral questions. His belief was that 
if such a system could be found which is rational then the 
question of the objectivity of its results can be left to look 
after itself. (22:213-214) It is my belief that universal 
prescriptivism provides a disciplined method of moral reasoning 
which refutes ethical scepticism because it makes moral knowledge 
possible. Through applying the proper method of critical 
thinking which Hare outlines, we can decide what is the 'right* 
answer.
Hare -recognized the importance of the intuitive level of 
mzral thinking but he notes that the appeal to moral intuition 
will never be adequate for a moral system. (22:11-12)
If we apply this idea to moral education it allows one to 
regard the intuitive level of thinking as %n important stepping 
stone to moral education and not as a necessary evil. In 
chapter one, I suggested that various writers had confused the 
early training of the child with indoctrination. I questioned 
whether it was legitimate to construe the unavoidable use of 
non-rational methods as necessarily constituting an indoctrina- 
tory process. ' <
If we apply the two-level theory to this context we can see 
how moral training using non-rational methods need not necessarily 
constitute indoctrination.
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Moral training is concerned with inculcating certain moral 
attitudes. It is a necessary part of moral education because 
as Hare says, (22:30) we want our children, 'to like and 
dislike the things they ought to like and dislike.' These 
attitudes enable the child to face the stresses of life because 
it gives guidance as to how he ought to live in terms which he 
can understand. (22:172-173)
On this theory, as I have explained, the intuitive level 
is not isolated from the critical because it is not self- 
supporting. The two levels must be seen as complementing each 
other. As the child matures, the capacity to reason should be 
increasingly invoked. Indoctrination begins when this is 
neglected and the intuitive level is regarded as sufficient on 
its o\m. Critical thinking at the second level is crucial if 
the child is to be able to question these assumed attitudes 
which are not always wise and too often reflect racial, religious 
and political intolerance. (22:172)
The important point to recognize is that at this early 
stage of the child's moral education, value-neutrality is 
undesirable. To demand value-neutrality is, as Gardner (15:78) 
argues, to demand no influence, no contact arid no teaching.
I have argued that there is no reason to support this view which 
is reflected in the ideas of A.S. Neill. It makes sense then 
to provide for the moral training of children and as Hare's 
theory shows, this need not be viewed as a form of indoctrination.
James Leming has -'.escribed a similar approach which he calls 
'moral advocacy.' Moral advocacy involves inculcating allegiance 
to certain norms such as honesty and respect for persons. (30:201)
Leming’s plea is that the teacher ought to advocate, in a well- 
reasoned manner, specific norms. He states (20:201) that 
failure to inculcate moral norms means that individuals are 
incompletely socialised with the result that the stability of 
society is jeopardised. Leming suggests that moral instruction 
can be organised on the principle of a 'gradecut of rationality.1 
As the child advances in maturity he is trained to expect the 
application of reason to understanding moral questions. In 
•this way the critical level of moral thinking becomes operative. 
(30:206)
Hare’s ethical theory helps the educator avoid the pitfalls 
of indoctrination because it is founded on a rational system.
In order to understand why this is important it may be useful 
to recall to mind what the concept of indoctrination implies.
It implies what I have called the closed mind, (cf 56:20)
(18:25), (26:18)
At its core it means that indoctrination is opposed to 
rationality because it diminishes rationality. Beliefs which 
are based on a fully rational method of thinking create the 
rational mind and become the point of departure which differen­
tiates indoctrinated thinking from thinking which is capable 
of critical inquiry.
A crucial criterion in moral thinking, if it is to avoid 
indoctrination, is the possibility of an impersonal point of 
view. Rationality in moral thinking allows for this possibility 
because it enables one to assume an attitude of objectivity in 
the sense of being unbiased.
Hare emphasized that rational thinking is subject to 
certain constraints and in this way shows that standards are
implied. It seems to me that the element of constraint 
appears to be an essential aspect of the concept of rationality. 
This is because the very notion of rationality requires 
adherence to rules and correct procedures.
How effective are the constraints which Hare proposes, 
especially as regards avoiding indoctrination in moral education?
Hare argues (20:31) that the ’logical thesis’ involving 
the two principles of prescriptivity and universalizability 
have 'great potency in moral arguments.’ This has been denied 
by G.J., Warnock. He argues (51:42) that Hare is miaguided in 
attaching so much importance to this principle because it can 
be i-oduced to mere consistency. By appealing to this principle, 
he says, I cannot reveal to anyone that their judgements are 
morally quite wrong, all I can do is to show them that they 
are inconsistent.
Kupperman (28:36) agrees that this principle does not 
take one very far into interpersonal neutrality because it 
leaves open the logical possibility that relevant differences 
could exist so that the moral requirements for one person 
could differ significantly from those of others.
He argues that although there is a burden of proof as to 
what counts as relevant differences, the true bigot or 
fanatic can disregard them. His point is that there is no 
logical flaw in this as long as one is prepared to apply the 
same judgement to oneself in a similar situation, Kupperman 
says (28:35) that a proper consideration of morality is 
necessary to carry us beyond the mere logical requirements of 
universalizability.
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Hare does not disagree with this. He insists that the 
principle of universalizability is 'no more than a logical 
thesis' and not a moral principle and therefore that it must 
not be taken to prove directly and by itself conclusions about 
how in particular we ought to treat people. (22:154) He denies, 
however, that this principle, as Warnock says (51:46) 'does 
not carry much fire power in moral argument.' Hare's reply 
(20:J5) ia that it is a mistake to regard this principle as 
•useless' for purposes of moral reasoning and that his argument 
does not merely rest on logic by itself.
To understand what Hare means by this it is important to 
recall what these two logical principles require of someone 
making a moral judgement. Prescriptivity involves an imagined 
situation in which I have someone else's preferences. This 
implies -that I have an equal aversion to jay suffering hat that 
person is suffering or going to suffer. Unless I have these 
preferences I cannot really be knowing what his situation is 
really like. 422:94) It is not therefore merely a cognitive 
awareness but also an affective and cognative.
Hare (22:91) makes a distinction between knowing that 
something is the case and knowing what it is like. Knowing 
what it is like goes beyond the mere logical requirements of 
knowing 'that.' It involves, as I have explained, a full 
identification with the other person's preferences. Hare 
says (22:92) that it is this kind of knowledge which we should 
treat as relevant and as required for the full information 
which rationality in making moral judgements demands.
The principle of prescriptivity requires that if I make
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moral judgements such as: 'Because you are a Jew you ought to 
be exterminated' or 'Because you have not paid me you ought to 
be put into jail*' then* I must be prepared to apply these 
judgements to myself by assenting to the imperatives* 'If I 
be a Jew let me be exterminated' or 'If I cannot pay then let 
me be put into jail.'
Hare's point is not in the final analysis concerned with 
what is or is not logically possible. It is simply whether I 
can or cannot stomach what my moral judgements, when universalised 
require me to stomach. He puts tho matter like this: (20:193)
'What prevents us from accepting certain moral judgements 
which are perfectly formulable in the language is not 
logic* but the fact that they have certain logical 
consequences* which we cannot accept ... namely certain 
singular prescriptions to other people in hypothetical 
situations. And the 'cannot' here is not a logical cannot.
It would not be self-contradictory to accept these 
prescriptions, but all the same we cannot accept them 
except on one condition which is most unlikely to be 
fulfilled - namely that we should become what I have 
called * fanatics.'.
It is unlikely, says Hare, because it is not empirically 
possible, only a fanatic would take a course of action which 
would jeopardise his own survival. Fanatics are persons who 
whole-heartedly espouse an ideal and do not mind if people's 
interests, including their own, are harmed in the pursuit of it, 
(20:105) The fanatic holds unshakable beliefs, he is not open 
to reason and this, to my mind, is symptomatic of the indoctrinated
person. The fanatic is the very opposite of the rational man, 
oblivious to the fact that he may be mistaken.
Surely an argument which enables you to bring home to your 
opponent that he is on a course of action which leads to 
fanaticism is not to be despised as 'useless.' It could, I 
suggest, provide a sufficient reason for a change of direction.
In certain cases it may be a powerful argument if someone is 
contemplating some act or making a moral judgement to ask them 
the following questions. What makes the act right for you and 
wrong for someone else? Or, if it is wrong for someone else to 
steal from you then what makes it right for you to steal from 
someone else? One could also point out that it is not moral 
to make exceptions for yourself. It could, perhaps, reveal to 
someone that his viewpoint is prejudiced because it is 
indoctrinated.
The principle of universalizability, together with an 
appeal to inclination, the facts and the constraints of criticism 
can help to promote sensitivity to others especially as regards 
the consequences of action. Immoral actions are usually 
undertaken by persons who are insensitive to the feelings and 
experiences of their victims. Moral education, if it emphasizes 
this principle together with other considerations mentioned can 
develop a sense of understanding what it may be like to be 
cheated, stolen from or mistreated and in this way promote the 
inclination to behave morally.
John Wilson (57) like Hare, stresses the importance of 
the universality principle in moral education and the need to 
teach children to take into consideration the interests of others.
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We have seen how Hare thought that the appeal to imagination 
is a necessary ingredient in moral argument. He likens it to 
scientific thinking in the sense that just as in science we are 
concerned with the search for an hypothesis and the testing of 
it by an attempt to falsify the consequences, so in morals the 
search is for principles and the testing of them against 
particular cases. According to Hare (20:92) the discipline of 
moral thought is to test the moral principles that suggest 
themselves to us by following out their consequences and seeing 
whether we can accept them. This sphere of exploration goes on 
in the imagination where reasons for moral judgements are 
universalized.
Q. Reddiford (41:78-85) supports the view that 'moral 
imagining' is a necessary condition of acting from a moral point 
of view. He says: 'Failure to universalize one's moral judge­
ment is a failure to acknowledge and act upon a fundamental 
moral principle, that of respect for persons, since failure to 
recognize that another person sees a situation in a different 
light is fundamental to the failure to accord respect to that 
person.' Reddiford shows that an imaginative understanding of 
the predicament of others is a necessary condition for develop­
ing feelings of sympathy and compassion.
Hare states (22:108) that an appeal to facts is necessary 
in moral reasoning and that unless moral thinking takes into 
account all the non-moral facts of the case then thinking is 
irrational. It is because the indoctrinated person will not be 
constrained by the facts that ho is able to hold the beliefs 
which he does. This reveals that a concern for truth is absent
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and that the person is basing his beliefs on other claims which 
have nothing to do with truth and objectivity, perhaps on some 
doctrine, authority or ideology, (cf 56:19)
The implications for moral education are that we should, 
as far as we are able, inform children of the facts, especially 
with regard to controversial issues. In this way we will be 
conveying the idea that rationality requires recognition of the 
relevant facts and that rational moral judgements cannot be 
made without reference to these facts* j
As we have seen, everything in morality, according to Hare, 
finally depends on and is subordinated to critical thinking.
It is the overridingness of critical thinking which holds the 
two levels of moral thinking together and makes them both
part of moral thinking. *
This emphasis on critical thinking; preserves a place for 
freedom in moral thinking. Hare defines the word rational in 
accordance with Brand's definition as referring to 'actions, 
desires or moral systems which survive maximal exposure to 
logic and the facts.' (22:244) The emphasis falls on the word 
maximal meaning that if moral thinking is to be rational there 
is no limit to the scope for reappraisal of our moral judgements 
and beliefs. However assured we may be of the correctness of ’•
our standpoint, the requirement of rationality opens up the j
possibility of being able to question and questions yet again 1
our beliefs.
John MePeck (32:6) emphasises that the most notable 
characteristic of critical thought is that it involves the 
appropriate use of reflective scepticism. This scepticism may
give way to acceptance but it never takes truth for granted and 
it is this element which Hare is stressing.
Hare (22$225) outlines three ways in which freedom in 
moral thinking is possible in his ethical theory.
Firstly, although we are required by the principles of 
prescriptivity and universality to identify with the preferences 
of others, this preference is only one amongst others that we 
may have. It will obviously influence our final choice btit not 
determine it. Our final moral judgement will be determined by 
our total sum of preferences so that we remain ’free to prefer 
what we prefer.'
Secondly, the escape route of amoralism referred to earlier 
also preserves our freedom to prefer what we prefer. Since 
logic cannot compel us to reject amoralism when any universal 
prescription is proposed, we are free either to accept or to 
reject it. This means that we need only accept the conclusion 
to which ’logic and the facts’ lead us only if it fits in with 
our preferences.
Thirdly, Hare suggests that we are free to propose our own 
evaluative or prescriptive principles provided that we are 
prepared to examine them in the light of logic and the facts.
If any such principles do not fit in with our preferences in 
general, we are free to reject them. This means that our 
thinking is safeguarded at its very source and it makes possible 
the notion of moral autonomy in moral education.
This last point has been challenged by Warnock, (51:4?) 
who does not see it as indicative of freedom at all but rather 
of anarchy because it negates reason. The crucial objection is
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that not only doeo it allow us to decide on the evidence but it 
allows us to decide what the evidence is. It seems to Warnock 
that if you allow people to choose their own criteria of goodness, 
then, moral discourse becomes irrationalist.
Hudson (24:208) supporting Hare, argues that moral discourse 
is not essentially irrationalist if it allows persons the freedom 
to choose why things are good, it is only irrationalist if once 
the choice has been made they refuse to be tested for consistency 
in holding thei,/ beliefs.
It is important to understand exactly what Hare is saying.
He is not claiming that we merely decide at whim what criteria 
shall apply but rather that the standards we choose should be 
considered along with all the other standards that are subordinate 
to them, in fact, the context of the whole way of life in which 
they form a part must be carefully considered. The choice made 
will be in the light of this full knowledge, (cf 1:88) It 
appears to me to be a gross rieconception to label this process 
as arbitary or non-rational. There will always be those who 
will not be satisfied by this argument but it seems completely 
mistaken to say that prescriptivism is advocating that one 
chooses for no reason at all and that it can, in MacIntyre's 
view, be equated with the modern emotivist self which lacks 
any rational criteria for evaluation. (31:30)
Warnock is, however, bringing to light an important 
truth about pr sscriptiviem, namely, that although prescriptivism 
gives sense to the idea of giving reasons for moral judgements, 
it cannot fully satisfy the demand for objectivity because the 
prescriptivist holds that ultimate standards are not so much 
discovered as chosen. This criticism does not, nevertheless,
destroy Hare's ethical theory, for it can be brought against 
any ethical theory. The question is whether any ethical theory 
can fully satisfy the demand for objectivity. As I have 
indicated earlier, the nature of morality is such that it 
cannot be objectively justified. This is because the ultimate 
justification of why one should be moral is circular, that is, 
any reasons one tries to give must, of necessity, also be moral 
reasons. (1:94) It seems to me that Warnock may well by crying 
for the moon. Nor can I entirely agree with MacIntyre's 
suggestion (31:25) that this choice of Hare's is simply a 
choice of values to which reason is silent. Hare stresses that 
morality is not easy and that it must be argued for. (22:223) 
Hare's insistence on the importance of the constraint of 
criticism appears to strike the final blow against 
indoctrination. This is because it requires that moral judge- i 
mentis or beliefs be viewed as essentially open-ended: forever > 
open to critical-scrutiny and therefore completely opposed to ) 
the closed mind.
With regard to moral education, critical thought would 
counteract the feeding in of moral conclusions eo indicative 
of the process of indoctrination. The constraint of criticism 
Indicates that a philosophical approach is possible, one which 
involves rational reflection and allows questioning of basic 
assumptions. It would mean removing the attitude of dogmatism 
with the emphasis falling on teaching children to think for 
themselves and also to think well. Sharp (42) outlines such 
an approach and stresses the need to teach children certain 
tools of inquiry such as impartiality, consistency, comprehen-
sivenese, an understanding of the relationship of parts to the 
whole and means to ends. It also implies understanding the 
role of ideals and the importance of taking into consideration 
the context in moral discussions.
At the heart of this philosophical approach is dialogue, 
open discussion about moral beliefs which is essential to 
cultivating an open mind on moral matters. It is the very 
opposite of indoctrination which can be seen as a way of clos­
ing off debatable issues. It makes possible the discussion of 
controversial issues and on occasion, where necessary, the 
adoption of a stance of ’procedural-neutrality' on the part of 
the teacher, (cf 46)
Baier (2:89) suggests two criteria that moral education 
should accord with if it is not to be called indoctrination. 
Firstly, it must show that some moral doctrines are derivable 
by some mode of reasoning and secondly, that the conclusions 
which result are such that everyone ought to follow. It has 
been the argument of this research report that Hare's ethical 
theory meets these two criteria.
CONCLUSION
Hare's ambition was to show the possibility of rational 
argument in morals. He has, to my mind, succeeded admirably 
in this task. He has provided a system of moral thinking which 
is rational because it is founded on a logical and consistent 
framework.
The property of prescriptivity reveals the intimate 
connection moral judgements have with action. 'or to say, 'I
ought to do x' and then not to assent to the command, 'let me 
do x1 is to reveal that one is not so much immoral as either 
insincere or illogical. This is because there is at least the 
appearance of a contradiction in a remark such as, 'I ought 
to do x but intend not to.' To abandon prescriptivity is 
to unscrew an essential part of the logical mechanism, it is 
to say, 'let us seriously consider this moral problem and when 
we reach our conclusion, let us not think that it requires 
anybody to do anything whatever.'
The property of universalizability reveals that unless 
we can universalize our moral judgements they cannot become an 
'ought.' In this way ve can see that rational action requires 
action that is generalisable to all agents. It brings in the 
moral dimension by showing that I cannot make exceptions for 
myself and others regarding moral judgements and still claim 
to be thinking morally or Irgje^lly. The constraint of 
criticism reveals that our thinking must accord with certain 
rules. It shows that if moral judgements are to accord with 
the normal use of the word 'moral' there must be some recognition 
of the principle of impartiality.
Hare insists that before one makes a moral judgement one 
must be consciously aware of its implications. This is achieved 
by an appeal to inclination and imagination and by a consider­
ation of the facts. Without the consideration of relevant and 
sufficient evidence, moral thinking is irrational.
The second level of critical thought makes Hare's system 
an open one. We are free to criticize our own convictions 
and this provides a base for freedom within reason itself.
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It means that moral beliefs must be held open to refutation and 
that we must be prepared to change our convictions in the light 
of contrary evidence, something which would be' unthinkable for 
an indoctrinated person.
Within this logical framework, rational argument can take 
place. The constraints of logic and the facts, together with 
the freedom of critical thinking provide moral education with 
a rational base.
The importance of universal prescriptivism !for moral 
education lies in the fact that it allows individuals to 
become moral agents. This is crucial for education since a 
moral agent is the very antithesis of an indoctrinated person.
He is able to hold opinions in the light of his own reasoning 
and in this way to be master of his own fate in the sense that 
it is reasoning that directs his life and controls his emotions 
and desires and not the reverse.
Dearden (ll), Barrow (?), Gewirth (l6), Critenden (?) and 
Peters ()6), are at pains to point out that it is not cl c that 
autonomy has anything to do with education unless criteria 
become relevant. They all reiterate in different ways the 
necessity to teach children to think well: consistently, 
logically and with due regard for the facts. Dearden (ll:9) 
and Critenden (39:121) especially, echo Hare's insistence on 
the importance of critical thinking.
Gewirth (l6:4l) argues that autonomy and moral autonomy 
are at loggerheads. Autonomy, he says, means deciding for 
oneself according to one's own criteria while moral autonomy 
means being able to conform to certain standards which are
independent of one's own choice. He suggests that autonomy 
can only be viewed as an essential part of education when 
limits are set. His point is that only if the self is regarded 
as having to meet certain rational requirements can autonomy 
be positively and necessarily related to moral goodness because 
these requirements are also the criteria of morality. He sums 
this up by saying: 'Only if the self of autonomy is the rational 
self and its laws the rational laws can the problem be overcome.'
Hare's system of moral thinking constrains the self to be 
the rational self and the laws (principles) he stipulates are 
the rational laws. The moral autonomy which results from his 
system of moral thinking can therefore be regarded as a desirable 
aim for education.
That moral reasoning should be guided by rational criteria
if it is to preserve a place for ethics within human life
appears to me essential. It is precisely because existentialism
regards the reliance upon principles as a denial of freedom and
hence a form of Bad Faith that it eliminates morality altogether.
It has been called a 'mood' rather than an ethical theory
which has a direct contribution to make to philosophy because
1of its rejection of exactness and objectivity.
I have tried to show that other thinkers express similar 
ideas to Hare. His notion of two levels of moral thinking is
1
Warnock, M. Existential ethics. Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 
1974.
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reflected in Aristotle'a distinction between intellectual 
virtues acquired by learning and virtues of character acquired 
by habit. ()l:l44) Modern thinkers such as Sidgwick, Ross, 
Rawls and others have also made this distinction in different 
ways. (24:427) It thus lends credibility to Hare's theory 
to find other philosophers with similar conclusions.
Thus, Hare's ethical theory has profound implications for 
moral education. It can, if not completely, for this would be 
utopian, than at least to a considerable extent liberate the 
child's thinking from the tyranny of indoctrination.
---oOo -
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